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ARTICLES
Tort Liability for Sports and Recreational Activities:
Expanding Statutory Immunity
for Protected Classes and Activities
Terrence J. Centner*
I. Introduction
Landowners and businesses providing sport and recreational activities to members
of the public have a concern about the safety of individuals engaged in the activities and
the liability of providers for injuries.' Historic common law "status" rules2 for invitees 3
and licensees4 generally meant persons providing recreational activities could incur
liability for failing to warn of a dangerous condition.5 Distinctions between licensees
* Terrence J. Centner is a Professor of Agricultural and Applied Economics at the University of Georgia.
Professor Centner received an LLM in Agricultural Law from the University of Arkansas, a J.D. from the
State University of New York Law School at Buffalo, and a B.S., with distinction, from Cornell University.
1. Product safety data of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission provides estimates of injuries
for many major recreational activities. NATIONAL ELECTRONIC INJURY SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM, U.S.
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION, ALL PRODUCTS--CY 1997 [hereinafter INJURY SURVEILLANCE
SYSTEM]. For snow skiing and snowboarding, it is estimated that there were 84,190 and 37,638 injuries,
respectively, in 1997. Id., Product Codes 3283, 5031. For horseback riding, there may have been 58,709
injuries, and for roller skating 54,609 injuries. Id., Product Codes 1239, 3216.
2. The duty owner to an entrant of another's property is determined by the entrant's status, be it
trespasser, licensee or invitee. See, e.g., Morin v. Bell Court Condominium Assn., 612 A.2d 1197, 1199
(Conn. 1998) (citations omitted). A North Carolina court enunciated the following basis for such distinction:
The obligation owed to a licensee is higher than that owed to a trespasser because the
possessor may be required to look out for licensees before their presence is
discovered. By the same token, the obligation owed to an invitee is higher than that
owed to a licensee because of the express or implied invitation for the invitee to enter
the premises.
Newton v. New Hanover Co. Bd. of Educ., 467 S.E.2d 58, 63 (N.C. 1996).
3. A person who enters premises in response to an express or implied invitation by the landowner for the
mutual benefit of the landowner and himself is an invitee. Invitees are owed a duty by a possessor of land
whereby the premises must be inspected and maintained in a reasonably safe condition. See, e.g., Morin v. Bell
Court Condominium Assn., 612 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Conn. 1998) (citations omitted). Landowners are liable for
injuries "sustained by an invitee which are caused by dangerous conditions known, or which should have been
known, by the property owner but which are unknown and not to be anticipated by the invitee." Newton v.
New Hanover Co. Bd. of Educ., 467 S.E.2d 58,63 (N.C. 1996).
4. The duty of care owed licensees was generally less than owed invitees but more than owed trespassers.
See, e.g., Morin v. Bell Court Condominium Assn., 612 A.2d 1197, 1199 (Conn. 1998) (citations omitted).
Persons who enter premises as social guests or for the benefit of the landowners are licensees. Landowners
must warn licensees of risks of harm or dangerous conditions of which the host has knowledge and the guest is
unaware. See, e.g., Salaman v. City of Waterbury, 246 Conn. 298, 305 (1998); Arvantis v. Hios, 705 A.2d 355,.
357-58 (N.J. App. Div. 1998).
5. For licensees, there may be an obligation to warn of known dangers that would not be obvious to the
licensee. See generally, W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON, ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 60 (5th ed.
1984).
Journal of Legislation
and invitees were abolished by statute in England6 and in some American states by case
law. Rather than looking at status, these states employ a basic test of reasonableness; 8
persons are owed reasonable care under the circumstances.
9
In spite of the presence or absence of distinctions regarding invitees and licensees,
all states have adopted recreational use statutes limiting the duties owed by landowners
who allow others to engage in recreational activities without a fee.10 More recently,
equine liability, 1 pick-your-own,12 and sport responsibility statutes13 disclose additional
categories of immunity provisions that limit tort liability. The proliferation of these stat-
utes, together with amendments to Good Samaritan and gleaning statutes, disclose a
plethora of multifaceted legislative strategies to provide immunity from tort liability to
qualifying individuals.
While immunity from a tort was originally a creation of the judiciary, legislative
provisions currently offer a larger and more significant basis for excusing a person from
tort liability. 14 Legislative immunity provisions have been enacted for defined classes of
6. Occupiers' Liability Act (1957), 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 31 (Eng.). It is argued that this fact may not be
significant to American law because negligence cases in England are tried without a jury as opposed to jury
trials in most cases in the United States. Jones v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303, 313 (Kan. 1994) (McFarland, J.
dissenting).
7. See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489
P.2d 308, 311-12 (Colo. 1971); Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445, 446 (Haw. 1968); Jones
v. Hansen, 867 P.2d 303, 310 (Kan. 1994); Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43,51-52 (Mass. 1973); Heins v.
Webster County, 552 N.W.2d 51, 57 (Neb. 1996); Ouelette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 634 (N.H. 1976);
Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A.2d 1110, 1115 (N.J. 1993); Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868, 871
(N.Y. 1976); Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 333 A.2d 127, 135 (R.I. 1975); Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d
293, 296 (Wyo. 1993).
Some of these states include trespassers who are governed by a test of reasonableness. E.g., Ouelette v.
Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631, 633-34 (N.H. 1976). See also Vitauts M. Gulbis, Modern Status of Rules
Conditioning Landowner's Liability upon Status of Injured Party as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser, 22
A.L.R. 4th 294-314 (1983) (giving a general overview of status rules); Michael Sears, Comment, Abrogation
of the Traditional Common Law of Premises, 44 KAN. L. REV. 175 (1995) (discussing the retraction of state
status rules for tort actions); Kerrie Restieri-Heslin, Note, Torts, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 2227 (1994)
(discussing New Jersey's adoption of a single duty of reasonable care to protect against foreseeable harms for
premises liability).
8. See, e.g., Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 333 A.2d 127, 133 (R.I. 1975) (retaining the ability to
look at evidence of the statute but status itself will not be determinative of the degree of care owed by the
owner).
9. See, e.g., Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868, 872 (N.Y. 1976) (finding that foreseeability shall be a
measure of liability under a single standard of reasonable care under the circumstances).
10. See Appendix 1: State Recreational Use Statutes; see also W.L. Church, Private Lands and Public
Recreation, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 491 (1991) (describing the justifications for recreational use statutes); John C.
Becker, Landowner or Occupier Liability for Personal Injuries and Recreational Use Statutes: How Effective
is the Protection?, 24 IND. L. REV. 1587 (1991) (describing the recreational use statutes); Martha L. Noble,
Recreational Access to Agricultural Land: Insurance Issues, 24 IND. L. REV. 1615 (1991) (discussing
insurance issues with respect to recreational uses of land).
11. See Krystyna M. Carmel, The Equine Activity Liability Acts: A Discussion of Those in Existence and
Suggestions for a Model Act, 83 KY. L.J. 157 (1994) (describing equine liability statutes); Terence J. Centner,
The New Equine Liability Statutes, 62 TENN. L. REV. 997 (1995) (classifying the state equine liability
statutes); Terence J. Centner, Modifying Negligence Law for Equine Activities in Arkansas: A New Good
Samaritan Paradigm for Equine Activity Sponsors, 50 ARK. L. REV. 637 (1998) (describing the grant of
immunity in relation to equine accidents).
12. See Terence J. Centner, The New "Pick-Your-Own" Statutes: Delineating Limited Immunity from Tort
Liability," 30 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 743 (1997) (contrasting state immunity provisions).
13. See Catherine Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreational
Safety Act-An Update, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 249 (1998) (analyzing a recreational safety statute that is
written as a sport responsibility statute).
14. See Frank L. Maraist and Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The Employer's Tort Immunity: A Case in Post-
Modern Immunity, 57 LA. L. REV. 467, 467-68 (1997) (noting that the judiciary provided and then took away
immunity, leading legislatures to provide immunity to narrowly defined classes of persons).
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persons, such as operators and providers of horseback activities,' 5 skiing, 16 and roller-
skating.' 7 Moreover, under some of the legislative immunity provisions, an actor is im-
mune from liability for negligent acts while remaining liable for more egregious con-
duct.18 An immunity statute may offer immunity for gross negligence while retaining
liability for willful failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition.'
9
This article examines four categories of immunity provisions that have been intro-
duced to lessen the liability of persons who assist others, provide services to others, or
allow others to come onto their property for recreational and other activities. To evaluate
immunity dispensation, Section II reviews Good Samaritan and gleaning statutes to
discern immunity prerequisites. Section III investigates the four categories of statutory
provisions enacted for providers of various activities: (1) recreational use statutes, (2)
equine liability statutes, (3) pick-your-own statutes, and (4) sport responsibility statutes.
With this foundation, Section IV identifies five policy issues presented by the differ-
ent immunity provisions for recreational accidents. The first issue is whether some li-
ability statutes provide excessive protection by shielding some defendants against gross
negligence. 20 The historic Good Samaritan protection was simply for negligence; Good
Samaritans retained common law and statutory duties, including liability for gross neg-
ligence.2' Why have legislative bodies enacted statutes that sanction gross negligence?
Second, the analysis of the immunity provisions shows explicit provisions to allow
commercial businesses to qualify for immunity in equine liability and sport responsibil-
ity statutes22 while contrasting provisions in recreational use statutes disqualify provid-
15. See Appendix 2: State Equine Liability Statutes.
16. See Appendix 4: State Sport Responsibility Statutes for Skiing.
17. See Appendix 5: State Sport Responsibility Statutes for Sports other than Skiing.
18. For example, a California immunity statute provides immunity for negligence while retaining liability
for gross negligence:
No cause of action shall arise against the owner, tenant, or lessee of land or premises
for injuries to any person who has been expressly invited on that land or premises to
glean agricultural or farm products for charitable purposes, unless that person's
injuries were caused by the gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the
owner, tenant, or lessee. The immunity provided by this section does not apply if the
owner, tenant, or lessee received any consideration for permitting the gleaning
activity.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 846.2 (West Supp. 1998).
19. For example, the Connecticut recreational use statute provides that an owner of recreational land
available to the public owes no duty of care if qualifying conditions are met, but provides an exception
whereby the owner remains liable "[f]or wilful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous
condition, use, structure or activity ... " CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-557g, -557h (West 1991).
20. For example, a Wisconsin statute may grant ski patrol members immunity for gross negligence:
(2) Except as provided in sub. (3), a ski patrol member is immune from civil liability
for his or her acts or omissions while he or she is acting in his or her capacity as a ski
patrol member, including the rendering of emergency care. (3) The immunity under
this section does not apply if the act or omission of the ski patrol member involves
reckless, wanton or intentional misconduct.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.482(2-3) (West Supp. 1997).
21. For example, a Virginia Good Samaritan statute shows only negligence being excused:
Any licensed physician serving without compensation as the operational medical
director for a licensed emergency medical services agency in this Commonwealth shall
not be liable for any civil damages for any act or omission resulting from the
rendering of emergency medical services in good faith by the personnel of such
licensed agency unless such act or omission was the result of such physician's gross
negligence or willful misconduct.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-225 (Michie Supp. 1998).
22. These immunity provisions were specifically written for business enterprises attempting to make
profits by providing a sport or recreational activity.
2000]
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ers from immunity if they are compensated.23 Selected exceptions in recreational use
statutes disclose ideas for retaining the general prohibition against compensation but
allowing remuneration in five specific situations. Amending recreational use statutes to
allow compensation in exceptional situations might be helpful in encouraging providers
to make available additional properties for recreational activities.
Next, a proposal to extract safety measures as a condition to a legislative grant of
immunity from damages is identified for the equine liability statutes. 24 Legislatures
might want to be more creative in championing safety when they enact immunity legis-
lation. Fourth, the topic of how the new sport responsibility statutes curb litigation is
addressed. Legislative responses that allow issues to be decided as a matter of law rather
than a question for the trier of fact may help diminish litigation expenditures.25
Finally, the profusion of different legislative responses calls for the coordination and
possible consolidation of immunity provisions. Rather than adopting statutes for given
interest groups or industries, legislatures may be better advised to revisit established
legislation concerning assignments of risks and revise provisions that are outdated or
incongruous with more recent statutes. Alternatively, a concise sport responsibility stat-
ute,26 as adopted in Wyoming,27 may delineate a way to reduce the number of statutes to
simplify liability rules for risky recreational activities.
U. Historic Dispensation from Tort Liability
A. Good Samaritan Statutes
Commencing with the California Legislature in 1959,28 legislative bodies have en-
couraged good activities and afforded immunity to persons who assist others in need by
limiting tort liability through a variety of Good Samaritan statutes. 29 Good Samaritan
statutes provide that qualifying persons are not liable for damages if they met a requisite
duty of care and other conditions.30 Therefore, a person seeking to avoid liability due to
a Good Samaritan statute must raise the statute as an affirmative defense and proceed to
prove qualification. 3 1 The defense of a Good Samaritan statute requires a defendant to
23. These statutes follow the Good Samaritan precedent and preclude persons who are compensated for
providing recreational activities from qualifying for the statutory immunity. See infra notes 123-24 and
accompanying text.
24. E.g., the equine liability statutes might incorporate encouragement for wearing safety helmets. See
infra notes 341-46 and accompanying text.
25. See Hansen-Stamp, supra note 13, at 277 (discussing the Wyoming sports responsibility statute).
26. A concise statute omits the delineation of duties and the scope of inherent risks. See Cathy Hansen and
Steve Duerr, Recreational Injuries & Inherent Risks: Wyoming's Recreation Safety Act, 28 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 149, 168-73 (1993) (discussing the Wyoming ski statute that declined to define duties or delineate
specific inherent risks).
27. WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 (Michie 1997).
28. 1959 Cal. Stat. ch. 1507 (currently codified, as amended, at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2395 (West
1990)); see also 2 STEPHEN E. PEGALIS, J.D. & HARVEY F. WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE §§ 6.13 to .15 (1981).
29. See Danny R. Veilleux, Construction and Application of "Good Samaritan " Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 294
(4th ed..1989); ALVIN LEE BLOCK & CHARLES BOND, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: HANDLING INTERNAL
MEDICINE CASES § 47.14 (1992); WILLIAM N. HARSHA, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: HANDLING ORTHOPEDIC
CASES § 8.06 (1990). See, e.g., the Georgia Good Samaritan statute, which provides: "[any person... who in
good faith renders emergency care.., shall not be liable for any civil damages .. " Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-29
(1982).
30. See infra notes 36-48 (describing the Good Samaritan paradigm).
31. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Lukefahr, 879 S.W.2d 137, 142 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (finding that the
defendant established qualification under the Good Samaritan statute).
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present evidence that establishes the essential qualifications and conditions of the statu-
tory affirmative defense.
32
Every state legislature has enacted one or more of these provisions to encourage
charitable or philanthropic activities. 33 Most Good Samaritan statutes provide immunity
against negligence actions so that qualifying persons who commit an act or omission
causing an injury while performing a good deed are excused from liability for dam-
ages.34 While the original basis of Good Samaritan statutes involved encouraging physi-
cians in rendering medical assistance, the expansion of the Good Samaritan paradigm
has provided partial immunity for a wide range of classes and activities.
35
Although Good Samaritan statutes vary significantly, five major elements have been
identified as forming the Good Samaritan paradigm.3 6 First, the paradigm establishes a
protected class.37 As noted, this class has been expanded by state legislatures.38 Second,
a zone of protection is prescribed by the paradigm: historically, an emergency situation
32. See, e.g., id. (placing burden on the defendant to establish affirmative defense); Willard v. Mayor &
Aldermen of Vicksburg, 571 So.2d 972, 975 (Miss. 1990) (finding questions regarding timeliness of action
and reasonableness of care that presented issues to preclude summary judgment despite defendant's
qualification as a member of the protected class under a Good Samaritan statute).
33. See PEGALIS & WACHSMAN, supra note 28, at § 6.13 (deciding that immunity is valued by emergency
medical service systems); Frank B. Mapel, in & Charles J. Weigel, II, Good Samaritan Laws-Who Needs
Them?: The Current State of Good Samaritan Protection in the United States, 21 S. TEX. LAW REV. 327, 354
(1981) (concluding that Good Samaritan statutes do not alter a person's decision on whether to render aid to
someone in need); Mitchell Mclnnes, Good Samaritan Statutes: A Summary and Analysis, 26 BRrr. COL. L.
REV. 239, 240 (1992) (analyzing Canadian Good Samaritan statutes); see also Eric A. Brandt, Student, Good
Samaritan Laws-The Legal Placebo: A Current Analysis, 17 AKRON LAW REV. 303, 332 (1983) (arguing that
Good Samaritan legislation was a response to an imagined rather than real problem).
34. This may not be true. For example, a Mississippi court found that a Good Samaritan statute imposed
reasonableness as a standard of care, the same standard as existed under common law. Willard v. Mayor &
Aldermen of Vicksburg, 571 So.2d 972, 975 (Miss. 1990) (finding that a strict reading of the statute disclosed
a standard of care of reasonableness).
35. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2398 (West 1990) (granting immunity to licensees providing
emergency medical assistance to participants of athletic events); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2-374 (1982) (persons
assisting a human who is choking); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-11-8 (1996) (licensees providing ambulance
service); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-5-131 (1992) (participants in 911 emergency service); GA. CODE ANN. § 5 1-1-
29.2 (Supp. 1998) (persons providing services in conjunction with catastrophic acts of nature); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-1-30.1 (Supp. 1998) (drivers of fire apparatus); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-30.3 (Supp. 1998) (persons
donating services to schools); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-30.2 (Supp. 1998) (drug abuse instructors); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-11-8 (Supp. 1998) (employees of compressed gas dealers assisting a law enforcement agency); GA.
CODE ANN. § 52-7-14 (Supp. 1998) (operators of vessels rendering assistance to persons affected by a
casualty); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/31 (West 1998) (persons providing services at free medical clinics);
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/1 (West 1993) (law enforcement officers); IND. CODE ANN. § 15-5-1.1-31
(Michie 1993) (veterinarians); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2799 (West Supp. 1998) (donees of food); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 851 (West 1985) (ski patrol members); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 205-b (McKinney
Supp. 1998) (volunteer firefighters); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.232 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997) (persons
assisting in clean-up of hazardous materials); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.233 (Banks-Baldwin 1994)
(assistance under reciprocal fire protection agreements); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4765.49 (Banks-Baldwin
Supp. 1998) (emergency medical personnel and agencies); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4765.49(C) (Banks-
Baldwin Supp. 1998) (supervised students enrolled in medical services training programs); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4765.49(E) (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1998) (dispatchers or communicators of requests for emergency
medical services); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.37 (West 1997) (persons on oversight health care committees).
36. Mapel & Weigel, supra note 33, at 327 (analyzing Good Samaritan statutes with respect to the five
elements).
37. This was initially physicians. The statutorily defined class may not include persons who already have a
duty to aid others in peril. See, e.g., Sims v. General Tel. & Electronics, 815 P.2d 151, 158 (Nev. 1991)
(finding that an employee's existing duty to rescue a fellow employee meant that his rescue efforts were not
covered by the Good Samaritan law).
38. See supra note 35 (listing statutes with different protected classes).
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or the site of an accident. 39 The third requirement of the Good Samaritan paradigm de-
mands a gratuitous act.40 Traditionally, an actor who collected a fee did not qualify for
the statutory immunity.41 Next, good faith is required under the paradigm, either as a
subjective state of the Samaritan's mind or an objective limitation on a Samaritan's
qualification.42
A standard of conduct that cannot be exceeded to qualify for the immunity of a
Good Samaritan statute constitutes the fifth element of the paradigm. 43 Good Samaritan
statutes provide that persons who are negligent in engaging in acts may qualify for im-
munity" and also may establish a duty of care.45 Thereby, Good Samaritans may remain
liable for injuries arising from gross negligence and the wanton disregard of the safety
of another.46 Immunity has been granted for injuries arising from gross conduct in a few
Samaritan statutes,47 but is rarely available for the willful and wanton disregard for the
safety of another.48
Because of the vagaries of political processes in fifty different states, many Good
Samaritan statutes fail to prescribe one or more of the enumerated elements. Therefore,
the Good Samaritan paradigm may not constitute an accurate description of a specific
statute. 49 However, generalizations about the paradigm assist in describing other legisla-
39. See, e.g., Clayton v. Kelly, 183 Ga. App. 45 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that questions were
presented whether a defendant was acting pursuant to a duty or in a voluntary fashion that would qualify him
for immunity under a Good Samaritan statute); Jackson v. Mercy Health Center, 864 P.2d 839, 845 (Okla.
1993) (finding that an emergency regarding the visiting husband of a patient was within the zone of protection
of a Good Samaritan statute); Buck v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 783 P.2d 437, 440 (Nev. 1989) (finding no
emergency so that a Good Samaritan statute did not apply).
Some Good Samaritan statutes extend immunity to persons who were not involved in an emergency or
accident. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 205-b (McKinney Supp. 1998) (providing immunity for members
of volunteer fire companies without reference to an emergency); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3811 (Michie 1998)
(providing immunity for veterinary professionals who render health care services to animals in good faith
without charge or compensation).
40. Many Good Samaritan statutes still preclude the collection of a fee or a charge for the service. See,
e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/1 (West 1993) (providing immunity for law enforcement officers and
firemen only if there was no fee).
41. This may be changing for some licensed medical personnel. See, e.g., Tatum v. Gigliotti, 583 A.2d
1062, 1064-65 (Md. 1991) (finding that the applicable Good Samaritan statute allowed a salaried emergency
medical technician to qualify for the statutory immunity).
42. Robert A. Mason, Comment, Good Samaritan Laws-Legal Disarray: An Update, 38 MERCER L.
REV. 1439, 1448 (1987) (noting interpretations in Georgia of the good faith requirement of Good Samaritan
statutes).
43. This generally involves some type of aggravated misconduct. See Mapel & Weigel, supra note 33, at
342.
44. This is generally achieved by granting immunity unless the person engaged in an act or omission
constituting gross negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
2395.5(a) (West 1990) (providing that licensees on an on-call basis to a hospital emergency room do not
qualify for immunity for acts or omissions constituting gross negligence, recklessness, or willful misconduct).
45. See Nicole Rosenkrantz, Note, The Parent Trap: Using the Good Samaritan Doctrine to Hold Parent
Corporations Directly Liable for Their Negligence, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (1996) (discussing the Good
Samaritan doctrine and its duty of care upon an individual or organization).
46. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2398 (West 1990) (providing that persons providing voluntary
medical assistance under some circumstances are liable for gross negligence).
47. See, e.g., 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/1 (West 1993) (providing that law enforcement officers and
firemen who engage in willful or wanton misconduct do not qualify for the immunity of the Good Samaritan
statute).
48. At least 14 statutes may provide immunity for aggravated misconduct. Mapel & Weigel, supra note
33, at 342. However, a good faith requirement incorporated in all of these statutes suggests that a person
engaging in willful or wanton misconduct would not qualify for immunity under these statutes.
49. See, e.g., Tatum v. Gigliotti, 583 A.2d 1062, 1064 (Md. 1991) (noting that the argument that the
interpretation of other states' Good Samaritan statutes did not apply to the statute under consideration due to a
distinguishing provision).
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tive strategies that are being adopted to provide limited immunity in qualified situations.
The veterinary Good Samaritan statutes are analyzed to further highlight the Good Sa-
maritan paradigm and to demonstrate how state legislative bodies have taken different
approaches in granting a common class of professionals dispensation from liability.
B. Veterinary Good Samaritan Statutes
At least eighteen states have adopted veterinary Good Samaritan statutes in which
veterinarians treating animals are the protected class' 50 A few states also offer the statu-
tory immunity to registered veterinary technicians
5 1 or others assisting veterinarians. 52
These veterinary statutes follow the Good Samaritan model and excuse qualifying per-
sons from liability.53 Veterinarians generally are required to be treating an animal in an
emergency before the statute's provisions apply.54 The veterinary Good Samaritan stat-
utes delineate various qualifications for an emergency, such as care at the scene of an
accident or emergency,55 care adjacent to public highways,56 emergency treatment to
sick and injured animals,57 or a combination of these qualifications.58
While the veterinary Good *Samaritan statutes may be modeled after Good Samaritan
statutes, many of them do not adhere to the latter three elements of the historic para-
digm. An examination of the third element of the Good Samaritan prototype reveals that
eight of the veterinary statutes follow the requirement that there be no fee,5 9 while ten do
not specify this element.60 With respect to the requirement of good faith, only eleven of
50. ALA. CODE § 34-29-90 (1997); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.097 (Michie 1996); CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE
§ 4826.1 (West 1990); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-64-118 (West 1996) (repealed effective July 1, 2001);
FLA. STAT. ANN. Ch. 768.13(3) (Harrison Supp. 1997); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 115/18 (West 1998); IND.
CODE ANN. § 15-5-1.1-31 (Michie 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-841 (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
37:1731(c) (West Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. § 2-314 (1999), CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 5-614 (Supp.
1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 58A (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 346.37, subd. 2 (West 1990
& Supp. 1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:16-9.11 (West 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 698.17 (West 1989);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8331.1 (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-15-15 (1998); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. tit. 132, art. 8891 (West Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3811 (Michie 1998).
51. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 340.328 (West Supp. 1998) (covering duly registered veterinary
technicians).
52. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.097(a) (Michie 1996) (including persons working under the direct
supervision of a licensed veterinarian); FLA. STAT. ANN. 768.13(3) (Harrison Supp. 1997) (providing
dispensation for any person rendering emergency care or treatment of an injured animal).
53. For example, the Kansas statute shows the Good Samaritan paradigm being followed:
Any licensed . . .veterinarian . . . who in good faith as a volunteer and without fee
renders emergency care or treatment to an animal shall not be liable in a suit for
damages as a result of such veterinarian's acts or omissions which may occur during
such emergency care or treatment, nor shall such veterinarian be liable to any animal
hospital for such hospital's expense if under such emergency conditions such
veterinarian orders an animal hospitalized or causes admission to such hospital.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-841(a) (1993).
54. Contra VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3811 (Michie 1998) (stating no emergency required).
55. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:16-9.11 (West 1995) (requiring treatment "at or from the scene of an
accident or emergency situation.").
56. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. Ch. 768.13(3) (Harrison Supp. 1997) (limiting the exception to emergency
care or treatment "at the scene of an emergency or adjacent to a roadway").
57. See, e.g., 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 115/18 (West 1998) (limiting the statutory disposition to
emergency treatment).
58. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 340.328 (West Supp. 1998) (providing that the treatment must be "to a
sick or injured animal at the scene of an accident or emergency.").
59. ALA. CODE § 34-29-90 (1997); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-64-118 (West 1996) (repeal effective
July 1, 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. Ch. 768.13(3) (Harrison Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-841 (1993); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 37:1731(c) (West Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. § 2-314 (1999); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 58A (West 1996);VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3811 (Michie 1998).
60. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.097 (Michie 1996); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4826.1 (West 1990); 225.ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 115/18 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 15-5-1.1-31 (Michie 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
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the statutes prescribe good faith as a requirement for qualification. 61 Although it is un-
clear whether a particular statutory Good Samaritan provision entails a subjective state
of mind or an objective limitation on the immunity, 62 a negligent veterinarian who acts
in good faith probably would qualify for the statutory immunity.63 On the other hand, if
a veterinarian engages in gross negligence, it is more likely that this veterinarian fails to
meet the statutory good faith requirement under a subjective standard. 64
The statutory standard of conduct that cannot be exceeded for a veterinarian to
qualify for immunity varies in the veterinary Good Samaritan statutes. Eight statutes
specify that the statutory immunity is not available whenever the veterinarian's conduct
is grossly negligent.65 This suggests that a veterinarian is not liable for ordinary negli-
gence, but can be liable for gross negligence. 66 The provisions of two states seem to
grant greater protection for veterinarians. 67 Colorado provides that the "immunity does
not apply in the event of wanton or reckless disregard of the rights of the owner of [the]
animal. 68 This suggests that gross negligence by a veterinarian is sanctioned in that
state. Rhode Island provides that the veterinarian is not liable, 69 raising the possibility
that in Rhode Island an injured plaintiff suffering from a veterinarian's willful disregard
of safety in medical treatment of an animal may not lead to liability for damages.
Thus, the eighteen veterinary Good Samaritan statutes show significant variations in
the qualification of professionals for immunity and the standard of conduct protected by
the immunity of the statutes. While the Good Samaritan paradigm may be insightful, it
does not accurately describe many Good Samaritan statutes.
C. Gleaning Statutes
The charitable act of allowing needy individuals to collect leftover products, called
gleaning, has been offered as a situation where the Good Samaritan paradigm applies.70
346.37 (West Supp. 1998); N.J. REV. STAT. § 45:16-9.11 (West 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 698.17
(West 1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8331.1 (West 1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-15-15 (1987); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8891 (West Supp. 1998).
61. ALA. CODE § 34-29-90 (1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-64-118 (West 1996); (repeal effective
July 1,2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.13 (Harrison Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-841 (1993); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 37:1731(c) (West Supp. 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 58A (West 1996); N.J. REV.
STAT. § 45:16-9.11 (West 1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 698.17 (West 1989); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 8331.1 (West Supp. 1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3811 (Michie 1998). In addition, Minnesota requires
humane assistance, which may be a comparable requirement. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 346.37, (West Supp. 1998).
62. Contra 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8331.1(6) (West Supp. 1998) (prescribing the good faith
requirement as referring to "the immediacy of the situation.").
63. But cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. Ch. 768.13(3) (Harrison Supp. 1997) (containing a requirement that the
veterinarian act as a prudent person so that it could be found that this additional requirement would not be met
by a negligent veterinarian).
64. But cf. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3811 (Michie 1998) (regardless of the interpretation of good faith, a
veterinarian who is grossly negligent in Virginia does not qualify for immunity).
65. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.097 (Michie 1996); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4826.1 (West 1990); 225 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 115/18 (West 1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 15-5-1.1-31 (Michie 1993); MD. CODE ANN.,
AGRIC. § 2-314 (1999) [relying on the standard set forth in MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-343
(1995)]; 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8331.1 (West 1998); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8891 (West Supp.
1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3811 (Michie 1998).
66. The veterinarian would also need to meet the other prerequisites of the immunity statute, such as
giving treatment in an emergency situation.
67. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-64-118 (West 1996) (repealed effective July 1, 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
4-15-5 (1987).
68. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-64-118 (West 1996) (repealed effective July 1, 2001).
69. RI. GEN. LAWS § 4-15-5 (1987).
70. Blackstone notes the claim that the right of the poor to enter another's ground after harvest to glean a
crop without being guilty of trespass may exist "by the common law and custom of England." William
Blackstone, 3 CoMMENTARES 212 (1768).
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As noted in the English case of Steel v. Houghton,71 historic support for gleaning comes
from Mosaical law, with the biblical books of Leviticus and Deuteronomy identified as
sources.72 Yet the act of gleaning opens a door to fraud,73 generally imposes inconven-
ience on a property's owner, and is contrary to an owner's possession. 74 Thus, although
gleaning may have been sanctioned in parts of England, 5 it was not part of English
common law. Permission is generally required before a person may glean a crop on the
property of another.76
Twelve states have adopted statutory provisions to cover persons allowing gleaning
activities on their property. 77 Following the agrarian connotations of gleaning, such stat-
utes concern harvesting or collecting "farm products from the fields of a farmer who
grants access to the fields without charging a fee.",78 Pursuant to historical principles,
these statutes limit their gleaning provisions to the removal of farm crops.79 One statute
contains a limitation whereby only persons picking fruit and vegetables "for the partici-
pant's own benefit..." may qualify for the statutory dispensation.8" Such a provision
may exclude coverage of persons belonging to charitable, civic, or religious groups that
are harvesting produce for benevolent purposes.
81
More recently, an expansive meaning for gleaning has been employed to cover the
donation of goods and distribution activities that accompany these donations.82 Persons
71. 126 Eng. Rep. 32 (1788) (describing an historical summary of gleaning).
72. Steel v. Houghton, 126 Eng. Rep. at 34 (Gould, J.).
73. Steel, 126 Eng. Rep. at 38 (Heath, J.).
74. Steel, 126 Eng. Rep. at 37 (Heath, J.). This justice also felt that sanctioning gleaning '"would introduce
fraud and rapine, and entail a curse on the country." Steel, 126 Eng. Rep. at 38 (Heath, J.). Blackstone
recognized that the act of gleaning could facilitate a trespass without the gleaner being guilty, but his reference
to common law and custom was couched with the phrase "it hath been said..." suggesting that it was not
clear whether gleaning was permitted without an owner's permission. Blackstone, supra note 70, at *212.
75. Steel, 126 Eng. Rep. at 37 (Heath, J.).
76. Steel, 126 Eng. Rep. at 37-39 (Heath & Wilson, J.J.) (finding by two justices that gleaning was not part
of the common law due to the problems such a right would create). "
77. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-107 (Michie Supp. 1997); CAL. CIV. CODE § 846.2 (West Supp. 1998);
FLA. STAT. ANN. Ch. 768.137 (Harrison Supp. 1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 9, §§ 2799, 2800.4 (West
Supp. 1998); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-404 (Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
324.73301(3) (West Supp. 1998); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.491, 41.510 (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-706
(1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.35-38 (Anderson Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 70-7-102, -
103 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 4-34-1 to -6 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 69.80.031-900 (West
1997). Tennessee does not use the terms glean or gleaning but rather pick and picking. TENN. CODE ANN. §§
70-7-102, -103 (1995). Since no consideration is permitted for the Tennessee provisions, TENN. CODE ANN. §
70-7-104 (1995), it is more analogous to a gleaning statute than a pick-your-own statute. Nevada also lists
gleaning in its recreational use statute. NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.510(4) (1997).
78. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROc. § 5-404(a)(6) (1999).
79. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-706 (1997); OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. § 2305.35 (Banks-Baldwin
Supp. 1998). Nevada defines glean to mean gathering agricultural crops, but the liability provisions limit
gleaning to food. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.491(1)(c), -(2), -(4)(b) (1997).
80. TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-7-103 (1995).
81. The possibility exists that use of the produce for a benevolent purpose does not meet the requirement
that the produce be used for "the participant's own benefit." Id.
82. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 20-1-6 (1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-57-103 (Michie 1991); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-5571 (West Supp. 1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-31 (Supp. 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 145D-1 to -5 (Michie 1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1301 to -1302 (1998); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/3 to
50/4 (West Supp. 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 672.1 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-687 (1997); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 166 (West Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1571 (West Supp. 1998);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.10 (West Supp. 1998); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 95-7-1 to -13 (1994); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 537.115 (West Supp. 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-716 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,189
(1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:4A-2 to -5 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-10-1 to -3 (Michie 1989);
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 7 1-y, 71-z (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 19-05.1-01
to -05 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 5.6 (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.890 (1988); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 8338 (West 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-74-10 to -40 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); S.D.
20001
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who donate products to needy individuals, including grocery products that are not crops
or even food items, are excepted from liability.8 3 Moreover, a donation that qualifies
under a gleaning statute may involve the collection of a fee if the fee is significantly less
than the cost of the item.
84
The statutory gleaning provisions for property owners are varied. 5 Some statutes
follow the Good Samaritan immunity model,86 while a few follow a recreational use
model.8 7 Two states recognize special gleaning provisions in the same statute that con-
tains the state's pick-your-own provisions.8 8 Given the different understanding of
gleaning and the two distinct statutory models, the immunity provided by these statutes
varies considerably. Of course intentional conduct resulting in injury to a recipient of a
product remains actionable.8 9 The gleaning statutes following the Good Samaritan im-
munity model provide protection and then delineate a standard of conduct that, if ex-
ceeded, would defeat the statutory dispensation.9" The most common provision is that
the immunity is not available if the injury arose from an act or omission that constituted
gross negligence or willful misconduct.91 Two of the statutes provide that certain negli-
gent acts defeat the statutory immunity granted to donors of free-of-charge food items.92
Thereby, these statutes offer little protection to donors.
Three statutes following a recreational use model prescribe the duty of care owed by
persons to those involved in gleaning activities. 93 Qualifying persons do not have a duty
of care to keep the premises safe for harvesting activities and have a reduced duty re-
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 39-4-22 to -35 (Michie 1996); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 12, §§ 5761, 5762 (Supp. 1998); W. VA.
CODE § 9-8-2 (1998); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 895.51 (West 1997).
83. See, e.g., NEv. REV. STAT. § 41.491(1)(a) (1997) (covering the donation of food and grocery
products).
84. Id. § 41.491(4)(a)(2) (1997) (defining "donate" to mean selling a product "for a fee that is significantly
less than the cost of the item sold"); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.80.031(2)(c) (West 1997)
(defining "donate" to include situations where a nonprofit organization charges a nominal fee to a donee
nonprofit organization as long as the ultimate recipient is not required to give anything of monetary value).
85. Note the distinctions between the gleaning statutes (supra notes 77-81) and the food donation statutes
(supra notes 82-84).
86. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-107 (Michie Supp. 1999); CAL. Civ. CODE § 846 (West Supp.
1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2799, 9:2800.4 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
324.73301 (West 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.491 (1997); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 71-y, 71-z
(McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.35 (Anderson 1998); 42 PA. STAT. ANN. §
8338 (West 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. § 4-34-5 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.80.03 1 (West 1997).
87. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 159-A (West 1964 & Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-
706 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 70-7-102 to -104 (1995). See infra notes 108-119 for a discussion of the
recreational use model.
88. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-107 (Michie Supp. 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301 (West
1999).
89. This often occurs through a statutory provision that excepts gross negligence or willful misconduct.
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(3) (West 1999).
90. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 846.2 (West Supp. 1998) ("[nlo cause of action shall arise against the
owner, tenant, or lessee.., for injuries....").
91. ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-60-107 (Michie Supp. 1997); CAL. CIV. CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1999); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301 (West 1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.491(1) (1997). The Utah statute provides
that "an injury resulting from gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional conduct . . ." will disqualify a
person from the statutory immunity. UTAH CODE ANN. § 4-34-5 (1995). In addition to gross negligence, the
Washington statute provides that intentional misconduct will disqualify a person from the immunity. WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 69.80.031 (West Supp. 1997).
92. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.4 (West 1997) (providing that the gleaning provisions do not apply if
the "damage, injury or death was caused by an intentional act or gross negligence of the owner"); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2305.35(B)(2)(a) (Anderson1998) (providing that the failure to warn of a hazard or the creation
or enhancement of a hazard may constitute negligence that would disqualify a person from the immunity).
93. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 159-A (West 1964 & Supp. 1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-706
(1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-7-102, -103 (1995).
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garding warning of any hazardous condition.94 Under the Tennessee provisions, persons
remain liable for gross negligence. 95 Under the North Carolina statute, a farmer allowing
a gleaner to remove crops only owes the gleaner the same duty of care as owed a tres-
passer.96 The Maine statute notes that it does not create "a duty of care or ground of
liability for injury to a person or property., 97
A few states insert a good faith requirement into their gleaning statutes.98 Under the
New York statute, a good faith requirement applies to the donor and the donation.99 The
Washington statute prescribes good faith for the action of the donor.1°° Moreover, a
requirement that the donation consist of "apparently wholesome food"' 0' or a product
"apparently fit for human consumption' ' 02 may apply. While good faith is an abstract
quality that encompasses the absence of malice or design to defraud,'0 3 and may also
involve "being faithful to one's obligation,"' 4 these statutory requirements of good faith
do pose an issue of whether good faith refers to the subjective state of mind of the Sa-
maritan105 or an objective limitation on the immunity. 10 6 The absence of a definitive
meaning for the good faith provision means it is not clear whether a Samaritan's negli-
gent conduct would disqualify a defendant from the statutory immunity.
111. Expanding the Protected Classes and Activities
The immunity from negligence provided by the Good Samaritan and gleaning stat-
utes offers models for relief from liability that may be appropriate for other worthy per-
sons. This section examines four categories of statutes providing legislative exceptions
from common law liability: recreational use, equine liability, pick-your-own, and sport
responsibility statutes. Persons who may qualify for immunity under these categories are
quite unlike physicians, volunteer firemen, policemen,' veterinarians, or others who are
involved in the provisions of services for the public good. Commercial businesses and
94. See id. In addition, the Nevada statute adopts a similar liability standard by exempting conduct that
constituted a "[w]illful or malicious failure to guard, or to warn against, a dangerous condition, use, structure,
or activity." NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.510 (1997).
95. TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-7-102, -103 (1995). Prior to the 1987 amendment, the Tennessee statute
provided immunity for gross negligence due to the fact that the conditions under which liability was
unaffected were limited to "willful or wanton conduct .. " See Cagle v. United States, 937 F.2d 1073, 1075
(6th Cir. 1991) (considering the Tennessee recreational use statute and its provisions that landowners were not
shielded from liability if their willful or malicious action caused a plaintiff injury).
96. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 106-706 (1995).
97. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 159-A(5) (West Supp. 1998).
98. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 71-z (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. §4-34-5
(1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.80.031 (West 1997).
99. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 71-z(l&2) (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1998); see also UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 4-34-5 (1995) (requiring participation and donation in good faith).
100. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.80.031 (West Supp. 1997) (prescribing that a person or gleaner donate
in good faith).
101. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 71-z (McKinney 1991 & Supp. 1998).
102. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.80.031 (West 1997).
103. Black's Law Dictionary 693 (6th ed. 1990).
104. Lowry v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 229 Cal. Rptr. 620,624 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
105. Under a subjective standard, a court could conclude that although a property owner was negligent, the
efforts to keep the premises safe were in good faith. Under this analysis, the property owner would qualify for
the statutory immunity. In the alternative, a court could find under a subjective standard that the property
owner's negligence involved the lack of good faith. Under this finding, the property owner would not qualify
for the statutory immunity. See, e.g., Lowry v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'l Hosp., 229 Cal. Rptr. 620, 625
n.7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that gross negligence may well constitute the lack of good faith in a proper
case, as such are separate issues under a subjective standard).
106. Anderson v. Little & Davenport Funeral Home, Inc. 251 S.E.2d 250, 252 (Ga. 1978) (finding that
agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant that the Samaritan acted in good faith meant there could be
no liability under an objective standard).
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others may be immune from damages in tort under some of these statutes. 10 7 The array
of the statutory provisions suggests considerable dissatisfaction with traditional liability
standards.
A. Recreational Use Statutes
Conservation groups and persons interested in recreational activities on rural lands
convinced the Michigan Legislature in 1953 to adopt a recreational use statute. 10 8 In
1965, a model recreational use statute' °9 was drafted that generally was used in the
adoption of statutes in those states lacking such legislation. Today, every state has a
recreational use statute governing enumerated activities.'10 Rather than providing statu-
tory immunity, recreational use statutes alter the duty of care for recreational providers,
including property owners, lessees, and the occupants of premises."' Through various
provisions, the statutes designate that providers of recreational activities owe a limited
duty of care to keep their premises safe." 2 A few statutory provisions for recreational
activities digress from the traditional recreational use model's focus on the duty of care
107. The equine liability, pick-your-own, and sport responsibility statutes allow commercial businesses and
persons charging fees to qualify for the statutory immunity.
108. 1953 Mich. Pub. Acts 201.
109. Church, supra note 10. The duty owed depends on the status of the entrant on the land. In some states,
the judiciary has altered this historic duty to provide a standard of reasonable care more consistent with other
tort actions. See supra notes 8 & 9 and accompanying text (describing the change from status to a basic test of
reasonableness); see also Joan M. O'Brien, Comment, The Connecticut Recreational Use Statute: Should a
Municipality Be Immune from Tort Liability, 15 PACE L. REV. 963, 973 (1997) (discussing the adoption of the
1979 Model Act).
110. See Appendix 1: State Recreational Use Statutes.
111. For example, the California recreational use statute delineates the altered duty of care:
An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory or
non-possessory, owes no duty of care to keep the premises safe for entry or use by
others for any recreational purpose or to give any warning of hazardous conditions,
uses of, structures, or activities on such premises to persons entering for such purpose,
except as provided in this section.
.. An owner of any estate or any other interest in real property, whether possessory
or non-possessory, who gives permission to another for entry or use for the above
purpose upon the premises does not thereby (a) extend any assurance that the premises
are safe for such purpose, or (b) constitute the person to whom permission has been
granted the legal status of any invitee or licensee to whom a duty of care is owed, or
(c) assume responsibility for or incur liability for any injury to person or property
caused by any act of such person to whom permission has been granted except as
provided in this section.
This section does not limit the liability which otherwise exists (a) for willful or
malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or
activity; or (b) for injury suffered in any case where permission to enter for the above
purpose was granted for a consideration other than the consideration, if any, paid to
said landowner by the state, or where consideration has been received from others for
the same purpose; or (c) to any persons who are expressly invited rather than merely
permitted to come upon the premises by the landowner. CUT Nothing in this section
creates a duty of care or ground of liability for injury to person or property.
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1999).
112. For example, the North Carolina statute directs recreational users be treated in a similar fashion as
trespassers for determining a landowner's liability:
Except as specifically recognized by or provided for in this chapter, an owner of land
who either directly or indirectly invites or permits without charge any person to use
such land for educational or recreational purposes owes the person the same duty of
care that he owes a trespasser, except nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
limit or nullify the doctrine of attractive nuisance and the owner shall inform direct
invitees of artificial or unusual hazards of which the owner has actual knowledge.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 38A-4 (1995).
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to address the assumption of risk.'13 Because of the decreased potential of liability for
recreational injuries, providers are encouraged to make their land available to others for
recreational uses. 1
4
The immunity of the recreational use statutes is generally available when a defen-
dant raises the statute as a defense. However, such immunity is not absolute." 5 A ma-
jority of the statutes maintain that persons providing recreational activities incur liability
"for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use,
structure or activity. ,, 1 6 Thereby, recreational use statutes may allow defendants
who were grossly negligent to escape liability for injuries." 17 Some statutes digress from
this general rule and retain liability for gross negligence. 18 The defense provided by the
recreational use statute means that causes of action in negligence can be dismissed, and
in some cases, causes of action in gross negligence also may be dismissed." 19
As one might expect, individual state recreational use statutes have digressed from
their historic model so that some provide quite different coverage in one state as op-
posed to another state. 120 Activities that qualify under a statute as recreational activi-
ties 12 and whether land or premises are covered by a statute are two issues that have
been dealt with differently by state legislatures.' 22 Another important issue is whether
113. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.525 (West 1997); WYO. STAT. § 34-19-123 (Michie 1997).
114. CAL. CIvIL CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1999).
115. See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 109, at 973 (noting that recreational use statutes do not preclude
plaintiffs from bringing lawsuits).
116. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1999). See Laura J. Perkins, Comment, A Practical Guide to
Recovery for Injured Air Sport Participants, 62 J. AIR L. & COM. 559, 589-90 (1996); see also Golding v.
Ashley Cent. Irr. Co., 793 P.2d 897, 901 (Utah 1990) (suggesting that gross negligence defined as reckless
indifference was not sufficient to show willful or malicious conduct).
117. For example, the California recreational use statute says that liability is not limited whenever there is
"willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity .. "
CAL. CIVIL CODE § 846 (West Supp. 1999). This suggests that instances of gross negligence may not lead to
liability.
118. For example, the Tennessee recreational use statute provides that: "This chapter does not limit the
liability which otherwise exists for: (1) Gross negligence, willful or wanton conduct which results in a failure
to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure or activity." TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-7-104
(1995).
119. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Brown, 785 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Cal. 1990) (ordering reinstatement of a judgment
of dismissal of a negligence claim due to the state's recreational use statute); Hoye v. Illinois Power Co., 646
N.E.2d 651, 654 (IUl. App. Ct. 1995) (approving the dismissal of a complaint based on actions in negligence
due to the state's recreational use statute); (Johnson v. Lloyd's of London, 653 So.2d 226, 231 (La. Ct. App.
1995) (concluding that passive or active negligence was insufficient to show liability under the state
recreational use statute); Bragg v. Genessee County Agric. Soc'y, 644 N.E.2d 1013, 1018 (N.Y. 1994)
(affirming the dismissal of a plaintiffs cause of action due to the immunity from negligence under the state's
recreational use statute).
120. See Becker, supra note 10 (discussing several important issues handled differently by states); Stuart J.
Ford, Comment, Wisconsin's Recreational Use Statute: Towards Sharpening the Picture at the Edges, 1991
Wis. L. REV. 491 (1990) (describing the Wisconsin recreational use statute); Jeffrey C. Kestenband, Note,
Conway v. Town of Wilton: Statutory Construction, Stare Decisis, and Public Policy in Connecticut's
Recreational Use Statue, 30 CONN. L. REV. 1091 (1998) (analyzing a court's decision that the Connecticut
statute did not apply to municipal property); see also Bledsoe v. Goodfarb, 823 P.2d 1264, 1268 (Ariz. 1991)
(noting that a limitation of recreational use statutes based on the type of land covered is an exception to the
general provisions of these statutes).
121. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 10, at 1600-02 (discussing the various activities covered by state
statutes); Glen Rothstein, Note, Recreational Use Statutes and Private Landowner Liability: A Critical
Examination of Ornelas v. Randolph, 15 WHIrrER L. REV. (1994) 1123, 1134-40 (examining whether the
plaintiff engaged in a recreational activity); see also Farnham v. Kittinger, 634 N.E.2d 162, 164 (N.Y. 1994)
(discussing whether the use of a four-wheel-drive, multipurpose vehicle was within the category of "motorized
vehicle operation for recreational purposes" as required by the state recreational use statute, N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 9-103 (McKinney 1989)).
122. See, e.g., Bledsoe v. Goodfarb, 823 P.2d 1264, 1270 (Ariz. 1991) (finding that a roadway was not
covered by the Arizona recreational use statute); Turgeon v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 630 N.E.2d 1318,
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minor compensation disqualifies a recreational provider from immunity under the stat-
ute. Historically, the statutory coverage only applied in the absence of a charge or fee. 23
Since 1979, the prohibition against fees includes admission fees so that various compen-
satory acts, charges, and services are permitted without compromising the protection
offered by individual state statutes.'
24
B. Equine Liability Statutes
Within the past ten years, approximately forty states have drawn upon the Good
Samaritan paradigm to enact provisions for qualifying persons associated with equine
activities. 125 An agglomeration of statutes, called the "equine liability statutes," affords
encouragement for equine activities by providing equine owners and other persons pro-
tection against civil liability suits for injuries to riders. 126 Equine liability statutes set
forth a statutory command whereby qualifying persons "shall not be liable for an injury
to or the death of a participant resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities. 127
Inherent risks are dangers or conditions that are an integral part of equine activities,
including equine behavior, unpredictability of reactions, hazards such as surface and
subsurface conditions, and collisions with -other equines and objects. 28 Variations in
some statutes assert that no person is liable 129 or a person is not liable 130 for injuries of
participants. Such directives are similar to the directives of Good Samaritan statutes in
1327-28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (finding that a public utility was the owner of land with respect to the lake water
near its land and such was subject to the Illinois recreational use statute); Michalovic v. Genessee-Monroe
Racing Ass'n, Inc., 436 N.Y.S.2d 468, 470 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (finding that a parking lot was not covered
by the New York recreational use statute); Tijerina v. Cornelius Christian Church, 539 P.2d 634, 637 (Or.
1975) (finding land not to be agricultural and thus not covered by the Oregon recreational use statute).
123. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 10, at 1602-05 (discussing fees and qualifying under recreational use
statutes).
124. See Church, supra note 10 (discussing the changes considered with the 1979 Model Recreational Use
Act). See, e.g., 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws 22 (allowing nominal fees by public entities and nonprofit corporations);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-11-302(4) (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1999) (allowing sharing of products and
contributions in kind to offset costs and eliminate losses); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/2(d) (West 1993)
(providing that a charge does not include sharing of game or fish, contributions in kind, or cash made for the
purpose of properly conserving the land); IND. CODE ANN. § 14-22-10-2(b) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1999)
(providing that a monetary consideration does not include sharing of game or fish, services rendered for
wildlife management, or contributions in kind made for the purpose of wildlife management); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 38A-3 (1995) (allowing contributions for remedying damages caused by education or recreational
use); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 75.001-.004 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999) (permitting charges if
they are less than an amount as determined by the premises' ad valorem taxes); VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-509(A)
(Michie 1997) (allowing incidental sales of forest products and actions to improve the land or access); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5791-5795 (Supp. 1999) (allowing contributions for damages or to insure against
damages caused by recreational use); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.210 (West 1988 & Supp. 1999)
(allowing an administrative fee accompanying the removal of firewood); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.52 (6)(a)
(West 1997) (permitting minor consideration in a variety of forms); see also Hafford v. Great N. Nekoosa
Corp., 687 A.2d 967, 968 (Me. 1996) (finding defendant protected by the Maine recreational use statute
despite the charge of a fee). In another situation, a fee for parking was found to be distinct from a fee to use the
recreational facilities so that the statutory exception applied. Hogue v. Stone Mountain Mem'l Ass'n, 358
S.E.2d 852 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987).
125. See Appendix 2: State Equine Liability Statutes.
126. See Centner (1995), supra note II (using the term "equine liability statutes").
127. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-20-103 (1993).
128. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1662(0 (West Supp. 1998).
129. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42-13-4 (Michie Supp. 1998).
130. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 53-10-02(l) (Supp. 1997).
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establishing standards of conduct; however, the immunity is circumscribed by the re-
quirement that the injury result from an inherent risk.13
The provisions of the equine liability statutes are difficult to generalize, as some
vary considerably. A few statutes delineate provisions whereby persons remain liable for
negligence.' 32 Such statutes do not provide much assistance to providers of equine ac-
tivities in avoiding liability for damages incurred by riders. Some statutory provisions
address providers' duties of care, 133 others establish duties.' 34 Provisions in the same
statute may delineate different standards of conduct that are requisite to liability de-
pending on the basis of the injury.' 35 The most common prototype provides exceptions
from liability for injuries resulting from the inherent risks of equine activities with spe-
cific exceptions under which normal state tort principles apply. In general, many equine
liability statutes that establish standards of conduct that cannot be exceeded provide five
major exceptions. 136
First, intentional injury is not condoned so that any allegation that includes an inten-
tional act is outside of the immunity of the equine liability statutes.' 37 Second, the stat-
utes generally do not excuse faulty equipment or tack.13 8 Next, anyone who commits an
act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard for the safety of a partici-
pant, and that act or omission causes the injury, is not entitled to statutory immunity
under the general standard prescribed by equine statutes. 139  This has the potential to
131. Because equine liability statutes involve inherent risks, they may have some similarities with the sport
responsibility statutes. See infra notes 170-274 and accompanying text. Yet equine liability statutes are not as
ardent in displacing or establishing duties compared to the sport responsibility statutes, so are quite different.
132. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. Ch. 773.03(2)(d) (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1997) (providing liability for an
act or omission that a reasonably prudent person would not have done or omitted); MO. ANN. STAT. §
537.325(4) (West Supp. 1999) (providing liability for failure to use the degree of care that a prudent person
would use); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-725, -727(2) (1997) (providing liability for foreseeable injuries where
there was negligence and a duty to act in a safe manner); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-21-12 (Supp. 1997) (providing
liability if the person failed to exercise due care under the circumstances); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27b-102(d)
(1996) (providing liability for an act or omission that constitutes negligence).
133. E.g., the suitability exception, whereby immunity is not available if a provider failed to evaluate the
ability of the participant, deals with a failure to use care. See infra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
134. E.g., for latent defects a provider may need to post signs. See infra notes 144-147 and accompanying
text.
135. A provider may be liable for injuries from faulty tack under a negligence standard, but for an injury on
the trail a provider may only incur liability if there was an act or omission constituting willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of the participant.
136. A number of other specific exceptions may apply, depending on the specific statute. In some states,
horse racing is specifically exempted from coverage of the equine liability statute. E.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 87.002 (West 1997). Several statutes specifically exempt products liability laws (e.g., IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-31-5-2(c) (Michie 1998)), and some states exempt trespass (e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 42-
11-4 (Michie Supp. 1998)), or animal trespass (e.g. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-21-119(4)(c)(II), 35-46-
102 (West. 1997)).
137. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.325(4) (West Supp. 1999): "The provisions of subsection 2 of this section
shall not prevent or limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional or any other person
if the.., person: ... Intentionally injures the participant." Id.
138. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.12 subd. 3 (West Supp. 1998) ("Subdivision 2 [immunity from
liability] does not apply if any of the following exist: ... (2) the person provided equipment or tack for the
livestock and knew or should have known that it was faulty to the extent that it caused the injury or death...
."1).
139. For example, the Oregon equine liability statute characterizes this exception:
Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall limit the liability of an equine activity
sponsor or an equine professional: (A) If the equine activity sponsor or the equine
professional commits an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton disregard
for the safety of the participant and that act or omission caused the injury. ...
OR. REV. STAT. § 30.691(2)(b)(A) (Supp. 1996).
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excuse gross negligence relating to injuries resulting from the inherent risks of equine
activities.
140
A suitability exception, a fourth category, means that negligence or gross negligence
is not excused in all instances. 1 A suitability exception provides that a person provid-
ing an equine who fails "to make reasonable and prudent efforts" is not entitled to the
statutory immunity.142 The suitability exception enables a plaintiff-participant to main-
tain an action against the defendant-provider of an equine if any one of three funda-
mental allegations is raised by appropriate pleadings.
143
Finally, a fifth category of exception often exists for land or facilities with a danger-
ous latent condition. 144 This exception is usually conditioned on the posting of a sign
warning of the condition.' 45 Such a sign requirement is in addition to a more general
requirement that equine activity sponsors and equine professionals must post warning
signs and use written warning notices in order to qualify for the statutory immunity.
146
140. See, e.g., Muller v. English, 472 S.E.2d 448, 454 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that evidence of
actions by a horse and rider were insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of conduct manifesting a
willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the plaintiff).
141. To discern the meaning of the suitability exception, it needs to be read with antecedent text. See, e.g.,
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20 (West Supp. 1998):
(b) Except as provided in Section 15 [regarding participants' responsibility], nothing
in this Act shall prevent or limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor, an equine
professional, or any other person if the equine activity sponsor, equine professional, or
person: . . . Provided the equine and failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to
determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity and
determine the ability of the participant to manage safely the particular equine based on
the participant's representations of his or her ability.
Id.
142. Id.
143. The three different allegations involve a participant's ability with equines, participant's ability with the
selected equine, and the equine activity. Under the first category, the person providing the equine must have
made an inquiry of the participant's ability. See, e.g., id. An allegation that a defendant failed to employ
reasonable and prudent efforts to inquire of the participant's ability to safely engage in equine activities would
raise a triable issue. The second category involves failure of a person providing an equine to determine the
participant's ability to safely manage the selected equine. See, e.g., id. A third category involves allegations
that the person providing the equine negligently failed to determine the participant's ability to engage safely in
the equine activity. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27b-102(l)(b)(ii)(A) (1996).
144. For example, the Illinois equine liability statute specifies an exception for dangerous latent conditions:
Except as [otherwise] provided . . . , nothing in this Act shall prevent or limit the
liability of an equine activity sponsor, an equine professional, or any other person if
the . . . person: . . . Owns, leases, rents, or otherwise is in lawful possession and
control of the land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because
of a dangerous latent condition that was known to the equine activity sponsor, equine
professional, or person and for which warning signs were not conspicuously
posted. ...
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20 (West Supp. 1998).
145. See, e.g., id.
146. The statutory warning notice requirement mandates that sponsors and professionals post warning
notice signs at visible locations near areas where the equine activities are conducted. The Illinois equine act
requires defendant equine professionals to post warning signs and use written notices in order to qualify for the
statutory immunity. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25 (West Supp. 1998). Professionals also must provide a
warning that is clearly readable in written contracts for professional services, instruction, and rental of
equipment. Id. The suggested language needed for the written contract requirement is identical to that
mandated for signs. Id.
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Several of the equine liability statutes show a statutory configuration that does not
follow a Good Samaritan model. Some of these statutes enumerate provisions whereby
participants have statutory responsibilities or assume risks, 14 7 similar to the specialized
immunity statutes for sport activities. 148 Generally, the statutes provide that persons
assume the risks and legal liability for injuries arising out of hazards inherent in eques-
trian activities. Thus, a defendant could advance a defense to the effect that the plaintiff
had assumed the risk of the plaintiffs injuries so that the defendant did not incur liabil-
ity. 149 Two statutes simply address presumptions concerning standards of care relating to
liability. 
50
C. Pick-Your-Own Statutes
Several states have adopted pick-your-own statutes to limit liability for situations
where the injured party should have used care while harvesting agricultural and farm
products for their personal use.15' While picking fruit or vegetables, or cutting a Christ-
mas tree, may be very different from more active recreational activities, the pick-your-
own statutes are part of the burgeoning immunity statutes being adopted by state legis-
latures.152 A majority of the statutes grant immunity unless a condition creates an unrea-
sonable risk accompanied by enumerated conditions. 153 This follows the Restatement
(Second) of Torts concerning dangerous conditions known to or discoverable by posses-
sors of property who cause harm.154 A possessor of property is only liable if such pos-
sessor meets all of the enumerated requirements: (1) knowledge of a condition or a risk
by the defendant, 155 (2) the failure to exercise reasonable care with respect to the condi-
tion or risk, 156 and (3) the injured plaintiff must not have had knowledge or reason to
147. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577p (West Supp. 1998) (providing that persons assume the
risks and legal liability for injuries arising out of hazards inherent in equestrian sports); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 47/15 (West Supp. 1998) (providing for the assumption of risks and legal liability for injuries and
damages from participating in an equine activity, except in specific situations); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4002
(1994) (providing for the assumption of the inherent risks of domestic animal activities); W. VA. CODE §§ 20-
4-4 & -5 (1996) (providing that persons are liable for acts or omissions which constitute gross negligence and
that participants assume the risk and legal responsibility for injuries and losses in equestrian activities); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 1-1-123 (Michie 1997) (providing for the assumption of legal liability for injuries from the
inherent risks of the sport).
148. See infra notes 210-18 and accompanying text.
149. Some of the statutes have "assumption of risk" in the title of a statutory section. See, e.g., KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-4002 (1994); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-123 (Michie 1997).
150. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 663B-1 to -2 (Michie 1995) (providing for a presumption that
there was no negligence); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 4103 (West Supp. 1998) (providing a rebuttable
presumption that conduct was not negligent).
151. See Appendix 3: State Pick-Your-Own Statutes. It might be argued that Maine and Tennessee have
pick-your-own statutes, but the provisions do not apply to harvesting activities if consideration was present.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 159-A (West Supp. 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 70-7-102, -104 (1995). Thus,
the Maine and Tennessee provisions are not considered to be pick-your-own statutes.
152. See, e.g., Centner, supra note 12 (analyzing the pick-your-own statutes).
153. For example, the Michigan pick-your-own statute says that "[a] cause of action shall not arise... for
injuries to a person.., who is on the land or premises for the purpose of picking and purchasing agricultural
or farm products... unless the person's injuries were caused by a condition that involved an unreasonable risk
of harm .. " MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(5) (West Supp. 1998). Additional conditions apply. Id.
But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42AI0 (West Supp. 1999) (delineating the absence of a legal duty rather than
immunity).
154. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965) (subjecting a possessor of land liability for harm to
his invitees only if the dangerous condition was known to or discoverable by the possessor).
155. This requirement focuses on whether the defendant knew or had reason to know of a condition or risk
that caused an injury.
156. A defendant would qualify for the statutory dispensation if said defendant exercised reasonable care to
make the condition safe or to warn the plaintiff of the condition or risk. E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
324.73301(5) (West Supp. 1998) ("The owner, tenant, or lessee failed to exercise reasonable care to make the
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know of the condition or risk that caused the injury.' 57 Four statutes follow a different
strategy and provide immunity unless the defendant engaged in willful, wanton, or
reckless conduct. 158 Under these statutes, defendants may escape liability for gross neg-
ligence.
An initial feature concerning protection under a pick-your-own statute is who may
qualify for immunity. The New Hampshire statute limits qualification to the owners of
land, 59 which might not be very helpful to operators, occupants, tenants, lessees, and
employees. The other pick-your-own statutes have broader coverage so the immunity
may be expected to apply to individuals involved in pick-your-own operations.' 60
A second feature involves a qualification concerning the location of an accident.
Immunity under the Massachusetts statute only applies if the injury occurred on a
"farm."' 16 1 Some small pick-your-own operations might not qualify within a definition of
a farm. A pick-your-own statute that limits application to farms may be overly restric-
tive and not provide assistance for some operations.
A warning sign to advise participants of the immunity protection is a third feature
that has been incorporated in the Massachusetts pick-your-own statute.' 62 An owner or
operator of a pick-your-own operation is required to post and maintain signs with a
warning notice explaining that the owner is not liable for injuries in the absence of will-
ful or reckless conduct.' 63 Similar to equine liability statutes, a warning requirement
serves as a precondition to qualifying for immunity.'
64
The question of how employees and contractors are affected by the pick-your-own
statutes is another feature that varies among the pick-your-own statutes. Generally, the
statutes provide that the rights of employees and contractors are not affected.165 This
condition safe, or to warn the person of the condition or risk.") This seems analogous to a negligence standard;
see also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 18-60-107(b) (Michie Supp. 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., § 8339(a) (West
Supp. 1998).
157. E.g., the Michigan statute requires that "[t]he person injured did not know or did not have reason to
know of the condition or risk." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(5) (West Supp. 1998); see also ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 18-60-107(b) (Michie Supp. 1998).
158. The Massachusetts statute provides that qualifying persons shall not be liable "in the absence of
willful, wanton, or reckless conduct on the part of said owner, operator, or employee." MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 128 § 2E (Supp. 1999); see also N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508:14 (1997); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
901.52 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1998).
159. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:14 (1997).
160. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 18-60-107(b) (Michie Supp. 1998) (covering owners, tenants, and
lessees); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 128, § 2E (Sup. 1999) (covering owners, operators, or employees);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(5) (West Supp. 1998) (covering owners, tenants, and lessees); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339 (West Supp. 1998) (covering owners, tenants, and lessees).
161. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 128, § 2E (Supp. 1999).
162. The Massachuesetts statute states:
Said owner or operator of said farm shall post and maintain signs which contain the
warning notice specified herein. Such signs shall be placed in a location visible to
persons allowed to enter said farm for the purpose of agricultural harvesting. The
warning notice shall appear on a sign in black letters, with each letter to be a
minimum of one inch in height and shall contain the following notice:
WARNING
Under section 2E of chapter 128 of the General Laws the owner, operator, or any
employees of this farm, shall not be liable for injury or death of persons, or damage to
property, resulting out of the conduct of this "pick-your-own" harvesting activity in
the absence of wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct.
Id.
163. Id.
164. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
165. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 18-60-107(b) (Michie Supp. 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(5)
(West Supp. 1998); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8339(a) (West Supp. 1998); contra MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 128 § 2E (Supp. 1998).
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means that operators remain liable for injuries to employees and contractors. Such dis-
pensation is consistent with the purpose of the pick-your-own statutes, which is to ad-
dress injuries to customers harvesting produce.' 66
The New Jersey pick-your-own statute deviates significantly from the above com-
ponents. 67 Rather than provide immunity, the New Jersey statute negates legal duties. 168
The absence of a duty only applies to natural risks or hazards inherent to agricultural or
horticultural land so that persons remain liable for other tortious activities. 69
D. Sport Responsibility Statutes
To provide for participant safety and to preclude lawsuits against persons providing
specialized risky sport activities,17 some states have adopted specialized statutes con-
cerning skiing,171 roller skating, 72 snow-moiling, 73 sport shooting, 74 amusement
rides, 175 or other risky sport activities. 76  The provisions seek to curtail liability and
lawsuits related to injuries from the inherent risks of sport activities so participants bear
the burden of damages from such injuries while engaging in the sport. 177 Inherent risks
are defined in some of the statutes. For the New York General Obligations Law, inher-
ent risks for skiing include:
the risks of personal injury or death or property damage, which may be caused by
variations in terrain or weather conditions; surface or subsurface snow, ice, bare
spots or areas of thin cover, moguls, ruts, bumps; other persons using the facilities;
166. See supra note 153.
167. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42AI0 (West Supp. 1998).
168. The New Jersey statute states:
[A]n owner, lessee or occupant of agricultural or horticultural land shall not have a
legal duty to protect a person who is invited onto the land for the purposes of picking
or taking agricultural or horticultural products from the natural risks or hazards that
are inherent characteristics of agricultural or horticultural land....
Id.
169. See id.
170. A recent analysis of a ski liability statute noted three legislative objectives: promoting safety, reducing
injury litigation, and stabilizing economic conditions for a sport industry. Barr v. Mount Brighton, 546
N.W.2d 273 (Mich. Ct. App.1996), appeal denied 562 N.W.2d 779 & 568 N.W.2d 671 (1997). Another state
court, evaluating the coverage of an Idaho ski statute, found a legislative purpose of limiting rather than
expanding the liability of ski area operators. Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 787 P.2d 1159, 1162 (Idaho 1990).
171. See Appendix 4: State Sport Responsibility Statutes for Skiing.
172. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-43 (Supp. 1998); 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 72/1 to 72/30 (West
Supp. 1998); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-31-6-1 to -4 (Michie 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 601-608
(West 1997); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1721-.1726 (West Supp.'1998); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:14-1
to -7 (West 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99E-10 to -14 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4171.01-10 (West
1994 & Supp. 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 52-21-10 to -60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. §§ 759.001-005 (West Supp.1998).
173. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-651 to -656 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 32-20A-21
(1998).
174. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1544 (West Supp. 1998); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 47-3-1 to -3
(Supp. 1998).
175. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 801-806 (West Supp. 1997); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
455B.010-.100 (1997).
176. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-120 (West 1997) (baseball); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-4-280
to -283 (Supp. 1998) (fishing); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1201 -1206 (1998) (outfitters and guides); 745 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 52/i - 52/99 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998) (hockey facilities); W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3B-1 to -5 (1996)
(whitewater rafting).
177. See, e.g., Skene v. Fileccia, 539 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), overruled in part by Dale v.
Beta-C, Inc., 574 N.W.2d 697 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (interpreting the roller-skating act [MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 445.1721-.1726 (West Supp. 1998)] inpari materia with the Ski Area Safety Act [MICH. COMP. LAWS §§
408.321-344 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998)] to provide that an injury resulting from a collision with another
participant must be borne by the injured participant).
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and rocks, forest growth, debris, branches, trees, roots, stumps or other natural ob-
jects or man-made objects that are incidental to the provision or maintenance of a ski
facility .... 179
Under the statutory directives concerning inherent risks, participants assume respon-
sibility for many obvious and necessary dangers. 179 Operators retain liability for negli-
gence outside statutory protection,18 0 including non-obvious man-made hazards.'
8
'
These duties may be called the "sport responsibility statutes."' 8 2 Persons providing
enumerated sport activities for participants, 183 as well as the participants themselves,
84
have statutory duties. Because these duties are important in fostering safety, participants
and providers who fail to subscribe to their duties may be liable for injuries to them-
selves or others.'
85
178. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 18-101 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1998).
179. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Mt. Southington Ski Area, Inc., No. CV 970340387S, 1997 Conn. Super. Ct.
LEXIS 2824, at *6-7 (Conn. App. Ct. Oct. 22, 1997) (approving summary judgment for a defendant where a
plaintiffs injury was from a rut in a slalom course); Rousseau v. Beckley, No. CV 95465970,1996, Conn.
Super. Ct. LEXIS 3509, at 8-9 (Conn. App. Ct. Nov. 27, 1996) (noting a ski statute provided immunity in an
action alleging that a variation in terrain caused an injury); McHerron v. Jiminy Peak, Inc., 665 N.E.2d 26, 28
(Mass. 1996) (finding as a matter of law that a bare spot was an unavoidable risk inherent in the sport of
skiing); Barr v. Mount Brighton, 548 N.W.2d 273 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), appeal denied 562 N.W.2d 779 &
568 N.W.2d 671 (1997) (finding that summary judgment was appropriate for a defendant in a ski injury case
in which the plaintiff had struck a tree).
180. See, e.g., Terry v. Ober Gatlinburg, Inc., No. 03A01-9701-CV-00026, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 76, at
*17 (Tenn. Ct. App., Feb. 3, 1998) (declining to grant summary judgment pursuant to a ski statute because the
negligent rental operations was not afforded immunity by the statute).
181. See, e.g., Brett v. Great Am. Recreation, Inc., 677 A.2d 705,718 (N.J. 1996) (finding that under the ski
statute, the question of whether an obvious, man-made hazard existed was one for the jury); Brough v. Hidden
Valley, Inc., 711 A.2d 382, 388 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (concluding that the absence of guidance
concerning the obviousness of an alleged man-made hazard meant the jury instruction was inadequate). The
question of whether a hazard is obvious being one for the jury. Brett, 677 A.2d at 718; Brough, 711 A.2d at
386-87.
182. See Appendix 4: State Sport Responsibility Statutes for Skiing; Appendix 5: State Sport Responsibility
Statutes for Sports other than Skiing.
183. The Colorado ski statute is fairly typical:
(1) Each ski area operator shall maintain a sign and marking system as set forth in this
section in addition to that required by section 33-44-106. All signs required by this
section shall be maintained so as to be readable and recognizable under conditions of
ordinary visibility.
(2) A sign shall be placed in such a position as to be recognizable as a sign to skiers
proceeding to the uphill loading point of each base area lift depicting and explaining
signs and symbols which the skier may encounter at the ski area.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-44-107(1)&(2) (West 1995).
184. The Colorado ski statute may again be used to show duties:
(1) Each skier solely has the responsibility for knowing the range of his own ability to
negotiate any ski slope or trail and to ski within the limits of such ability....
(2) Each skier has the duty to maintain control of his speed and course at all times
when skiing and to maintain a proper lookout so as to be able to avoid other skiers and
objects. However, the primary duty shall be on the person skiing downhill to avoid
collision with any person or objects below him.
Id. § 33-44-109 (West 1998).
185. For example, the Massachusetts ski statute delineates participant assumption of risk for injuries:
A skier skiing down hill shall have the duty to avoid any collision with any other
skier, person or object on the hill below him, and, except as otherwise provided in this
chapter, the responsibility for collisions by any skier with any other skier or person
shall be solely that of the skier or person involved and not that of the operator, and the
responsibility for the collision with any obstruction, man-made or otherwise, shall be
solely that of the skier and not that of the operator, provided that such obstruction is
properly marked pursuant to the regulations promulgated by the board.
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A number of reasons may be offered to explain why commercial recreational opera-
tions secured a sport responsibility statute rather than amending provisions regarding
fees in the recreational use statutes. First, there may have been a reluctance to interfere
with established recreational use statutes due to a fear that changes would interrupt es-
tablished principles and might curtail the immunity in special cases. Second, recrea-
tional use statutes incorporated the assumption that they were limited to persons not
charging an admission fee,186 or at a minimum, circumscribing the remuneration allowed
to qualify for the statutory immunity. 8 7 Broadening recreational use statutes to cover
commercial enterprises would have required a major change. 88 Interest groups may
have found it advantageous to proceed with specific legislation for individual sports that
did not change or threaten existing dispensation provided for other recreational activities
under recreational use statutes.1
8 9
The recreational use model does not differentiate between inherent risks and other
risks. Disjunctive statutory language would be needed to incorporate such a distinc-
tion.' 90 A statutory strategy was needed that placed risks inherent in the sport on partici-
pants, while having property owners or recreational activity providers responsible for
other risks under tort law provisions.1 9' It was easier to draft a separate new statute.
Another reason for separate statutes is the distinct risks of different commercial recrea-
tional activities.' 92 Because a description of inherent risks for skiing is different from the
inherent risks of other risky sports, it was easier to draft legislation on the inherent risks
of a single sport. 193 Piecemeal legislation only applying to a given industry entails fewer
exceptions so that sport-specific statutes were politically advantageous.194
Although the various sport responsibility statutes have numerous specialized provi-
sions, four significant features may be distinguished. The first two attributes involve
duties: for participants and for providers. Prohibitions against recovery for some injuries
and a grant of immunity for sport providers are two other important attributes.
1. Duties for Providers
A general provision of most sport responsibility statutes is to enumerate duties for
persons making property or activities available to the public. Under ski statutes, provid-
•.. A skier shall be presumed to know the range of his own ability to ski on any slope,
trail or area. A skier shall be presumed to know of the existence of certain
unavoidable risks inherent in the sport of skiing, which shall include, but not be
limited to, variations in terrain, surface or subsurface snow, ice conditions or bare
spots, and shall assume the risk of injury or loss caused by such inherent risks.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 143, § 710 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998).
186. The issue of persons charging fees qualifying for the dispensation provided by recreational use statutes
is an issue for further consideration. However, rather than open this issue with an amendment to the
recreational use statute, operators of commercial recreational activities seem to have found it easier to advance
separate legislation.
187. Various other forms of compensation are permitted. See infra notes 317-36.
188. Recreational use statutes were not intended for commercial activities.
189. This has involved legislation on a sport-by-sport basis.
190. If recreational use statutes were revised to differentiate inherent risks, they might become rather long,
especially if they attempted to enumerate specialized provisions for particular activities. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. §§ 05.45.010-.210 (Michie 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-44-101 to -114 (West 1995)
(delineating specialized provisions on skiing that are rather lengthy).
191. Again, specialized and detailed provisions are required for the responsibility statutes, and such
provisions would be completely different from the recreational use provisions.
192. The numerous exceptions incorporated in many equine liability statutes disclose a desire to legislate
different liability rules for different situations. See supra notes 137-150 and accompanying text.
193. Contra WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 (Michie 1997).
194. By limiting coverage to a single sport, it could be written so fewer persons would object.
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ers often bear responsibilities to have trained personnel, 195 inspect slopes, 196 and to post
appropriate warning and informational signs or other safety features. 197 Because sport
responsibility statutes enumerate duties for providers, they may increase liability due to
specific duties set forth by the legislative grant. 198 Moreover, some statutes decline to
overrule common-law duties,' 99 while other statutory duties may be interpreted to pre-
clude persons from obtaining releases from liability.200 In these cases, the provisions
may restrict the options available to reduce liability for persons providing commercial
recreational activities.
The connotations of statutory duties and releases were considered by the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court in Murphy v. North American River Runners, Inc.20' A plaintiff
sued for injuries that occurred on a rafting trip,20 2 an activity within the provisions of the
West Virginia Whitewater Responsibility Act.20 3 Based upon the provisions of an an-
ticipatory release signed by the plaintiff, the defendant outfitter moved for summary
judgment, which was granted by the trial court.2°  On appeal, the court found that the
Whitewater Responsibility Act established a statutory standard of care.20 5 Commercial
whitewater guides need to "conform to the standard of care expected of members of
their profession. 20 6 Any release that purported to exempt an outfitter from liability to
someone who was bound by the statutory duty was unenforceable. 20 7 By averring that
the defendant's guide had failed to conform with the statutory duty of care, the plaintiff
established an issue of material fact.20 8 Because the Whitewater Responsibility Act
established a standard of care that was the existing standard of care expected of white-
water guides, the Act did not meaningfully alter the standard of care owed to whitewater
participants.20 9
2. Duties for Participants
A second feature of sport responsibility statutes involves specified duties or respon-
sibilities for participants. 2' 0 The most common provision says that sport participants
195. E.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 18-103 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1998) (requiring employee training
sessions).
196. See id. (mandating inspection of slopes and trails at least twice a day).
197. See supra note 183 (duties of providers under the Colorado ski statute).
198. See, e.g., Sytner v. State, 645 N.Y.S.2d 654, 656 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (finding that the provider
failed to comply with the state ski statute concerning appropriate signs of maintenance activities).
199. See, e.g., Bayer v. Crested Butte Mountain Resort, Inc., 960 P.2d 70, 80 (Colo.1998) (concluding that
Colorado's ski statute did not supercede the common-law standard of care for ski lift operators).
200. See, e.g.,Yauger v. Skiing Enters., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 60, 61 (Wis. 1996) (allowing plaintiffs to
continue with a suit involving a ski accident despite an exculpatory contract because it was void as against
public policy); Murphy v. North Am. River Runners, Inc., 412 S.E.2d 504, 512-13 (W.Va. 1991) (finding that
a standard of care was established by the statute and it could not be altered by a release form, meaning a
whitewater outfitter was not entitled to summary judgment).
201. 412 S.E.2d 504 (W.Va. 1991).
202. See id. at 508.
203. W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3B-1 to -5 (1996). Under the Act, outfitters and guides are granted an exception
from liability if they comply with statutory duties and applicable rules. Id. §§ 20-3B-4 & -5.
204. Murphy, 412 S.E.2d at 508.
205. See id. at 511-12.
206. Id. (citing W. VA. CODE § 20-3B-3(b) (1996)).
207. Murphy, 412 S.E.2d at 512.
208. Id. at 512-13.
209. Under the statute, the guide needs to conform the standard of care expected of members of the
profession, which seems to be very similar to a reasonable duty of care. W. VA. CODE § 20-3B-3(b) (1996).
210. This may include passengers of tramways and ski lifts as well as skiers. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§
23-2-735, -736 (1995): "No passenger may: (1) board or disembark from a passenger tramway except at an
area designated for such purpose ..." Id. § 23-2-735. "A skier has the duty to ski at all times in a mannerthat
avoids injury to the skier and others and to be aware of the inherent risks of the sport." Id. § 23-2-736(1).
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have a duty to engage in a sport within the limits of their ability.2 11 Participants may also
have responsibilities to read and obey signs and directions so as to better engage in safe
sport activities.212 Furthermore, cases have interpreted this duty to mean that participants
are liable for injuries from obvious and necessary dangers. 213 This follows the historic
common-law doctrine volenti non fit injuria.214 This doctrine determines the presence or
absence of a legal duty by employing an inherent risk analysis.2t 5
Participant duties operate with other provisions of the sport responsibility statutes to
reduce situations in which participants can recover damages for injuries from provid-
ers.21 6 For example, skiers straying from designated trails may compromise their ability
to recover for injuries.217 At the same time, participant duties may create liability for
injuries to fellow participants under a statute's provisions. 2,8
3. Prohibitions Against Recovery
A third feature of sport responsibility statutes is a statutory provision that precludes
participants from recovering for some injuries. In general, participants cannot "make any
claim against or recover from any ski area operator for injury resulting from any of the
inherent dangers and risks of skiing., 219 In a few instances, sport responsibility statutes
provide that spectators also assume inherent risks.220 The duty for sport participants
means that they assume inherent risks of the sport in a similar manner as under equine
liability statutes.22 1
A critical issue under sport responsibility statutes is whether a court can determine
what is an inherent risk or whether this issue will require a jury determination.222 Al-
though some courts have found that a sport responsibility statute enabled them to dis-
miss an injury case as a matter of law because the injury was from an inherent risk of the
sport,22 3 other courts have left the issue for a jury.2 24
The consideration of a number of cases involving skiing injuries have allowed
courts to grant summary judgment without a trial. In Schaefer v. Mt. Southington Ski
211. See supra notes 184-185 (participant duties under the ski statutes).
212. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 143, §710 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998) (directing skiers not to
ski on closed trails and to have attached to skis a device to prevent a runaway ski).
213. Schmitz v. Cannonsburg Skiing Corp., 428 N.W.2d 742, 743 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that the
legislature decided that skiers assume the obvious and necessary dangers of skiing under the Michigan ski
statute, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 408.321-344 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996)).
214. By engaging in the action, the person accepts obvious and necessary dangers. See Hansen and Duerr,
supra note 26, at 154-58 (presenting volenti nonfit injuria as primary assumption of risk).
215. See Hansen-Stamp, supra note 13, at 251.
216. See infra notes 248-274 and accompanying text (discussing immunity for providers of sport activities).
217. See, e.g., Long v. Bogus Basin Recreational Ass'n, 869 P.2d 230, 233 (Idaho 1994) (finding that a
skier had violated statutory duties when he went off designated trails).
218. See, e.g., Duncan v. Kelly, 671 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (finding that a participant
may be liable for injuries to a fellow participant due to a breach of the statutory duty to remain in control of
speed and course so as to avoid contact with other skiers).
219. COLO. REv. STAT. § 33-44-112 (West 1995).
220. 'See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99E-13 (1997) (stating that "[rioller skaters and spectators are deemed to
have knowledge of and to assume the inherent risks of roller skating. .. ").
221. See supra notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
222. As noted by Hansen-Stamp, if courts decide what is an inherent risk, a jury trial can be avoided.
Hansen-Stamp, supra note 13, at 277.
223. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Mt. Southington Ski Area, Inc., No. CV 970340387S, 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. Ct.
LEXIS 2864, at *8-9 (Conn. App. Ct. Oct. 22, 1997); Rousseau v. Beckley, 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. Ct. LEXIS
3509, at *6-7 (Conn, App. Ct. Nov. 27, 1996); McHerron v. Jiminy Peak, Inc., 665 N.E.2d 26, 28 (Mass.
1996); Saldarini v. Wachusett Mountain Ski Area, Inc., 665 N.E.2d 79, 79 (Mass. 1996); Giordano v. Shanty
Hollow Corp., 617 N.Y.S.2d 984,985 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
224. See, e.g. Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 872 P.2d 782, 789 (Mont. 1994); Merrill v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp.,
698 A.2d 1042, 1044 (Me. 1997).
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Area, Inc., a plaintiff was injured when she hit a rut on a slalom course.225 The defen-
dant ski provider argued that it was immune because of the provisions of the Connecti-
cut ski statute.226 Under the statute, the plaintiff assumed responsibility for the hazards
inherent in the sport of skiing.227 The statutory description of inherent risks provided
that such risks included variations in the terrain of the trail or slope and variations in
snow conditions. 228 Pursuant to the statute's definition and the plaintiffs allegations, the
court found no issue of fact to be determined.229 As a matter of law, the plaintiffs inju-
ries arose from an inherent risk.230
A Montana court concluded that the issue of whether a plaintiffs injuries were
caused by risks inherent to skiing could not be determined as a matter of law.23' The
plaintiff was injured when he left a trail and hit a rocky outcropping. 232 Because he was
not on the trail, he was not injured within the "skiing terrain" covered by the ski stat-
ute.233 Rather, the question presented was whether the rocky outcropping causing plain-
tiff's injuries was within the statutory definition of a bare spot.234 The court suggested
that a jury needed to make the determination whether the injury resulted from an inher-
ent risk.235
A lawsuit for skiing injuries in Maine led to a similar result:236 the court decided a
jury was required to determine whether the skier's injuries were caused by risks inherent
in skiing. 237 However, the statute failed to specify these risks.238 Given the absence of a
definition, the court drew upon case law to find that the issue of whether an injury was
from an inherent risk depended on the factual circumstances.239 Thus, a trier of fact was
needed. Because Maine's current ski statute defines inherent risks,2 40 a future case con-
225. Schaefer v. Mt. Southington Ski Area, Inc., No. CV 970340387S, 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 2864,
at *7 (Conn. App. Ct. Oct. 22, 1997).
226. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-212 (West 1990). The defendant also argued that it had not breached
any duty to the plaintiff. Schaefer, 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 2864, at *7.
227. Schaefer, 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 2864, at *7.
228. The Connecticute statute states:
Each skier shall assume the risk of and legal responsibility for any injury to his person
or property arising out of the hazards inherent in the sport of skiing, unless the injury
was proximately caused by the negligent operation of the ski area by the ski area
operator, his agents or employees. Such hazards include, but are not limited to: (1)
Variations in the terrain of the trail or slope which is marked in accordance with
subdivision (3) of section 29-211 or variations in surface or subsurface snow or ice
conditions, except that no skier assumes the risk of variations which are caused by the
operator unless such variations are caused by snow making, snow grooming or rescue
operations....
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-212 (West 1990).
229. Schaefer, 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 2864, at *8-9.
230. Id.
231. Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 872 P.2d 782, 789 (Mont. 1994).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-736(4)(b) (1995) ("Risks inherent in the sport of skiing are: ... (b) bare
spots and thin snow cover caused by limited snowfall, melting, wind erosion, skier action, grooming, or
unconsolidated base....").
235. Mead, 872 P.2d at 789.
236. Merrill v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 698 A.2d 1042, 1044 (Me. 1997).
237. Id.
238. Id. The statute in issue was replaced by Maine's current ski statute. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §
15217 (West Supp. 1997). The absence of a detailed definition of inherent risks should not necessarily relegate
the determination to a jury. See Hansen-Stamp, supra note 13, at 273 - 76 (claiming that the Wyoming statute
and its absence of a detailed description of inherent risks should not preclude the court from determining
whether a condition causing the injury was an inherent risk).
239. Merrill, 698 A.2d at 1044.
240. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 15217(l)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
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sidering whether a skiing injury was from an inherent risk might be decided as a matter
of law.24t
In addition to a recreational use statute, Wyoming has adopted a sport responsibility
statute known as the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act.242 With the most recent statu-
tory amendment, the legislature declined to enumerate what risks were within the statu-
tory definition of "inherent risks."243 In a detailed analysis of the Wyoming statute, Han-
sen-Stamp argues that the issue of whether an injury was a result of an inherent risk is a
question of law.244 Pursuant to the statute, if an inherent risk caused an injury, the de-
fendant would not owe a duty to the plaintiff.245 For a case where the plaintiff's injury
resulted from an inherent risk, the pre-trial motion to dismiss or request for summary
judgment would plead the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act as a defense of failure to
state a claim for which relief can be granted.246 If the court determined an injury was
caused by a condition that was an inherent risk, the absence of a duty by the defendant
would require dismissal of the case.247
4. Immunity for Sport Providers
A fourth feature of some sport responsibility statutes involves a grant of immunity
for sport providers. Sport participants may grant activity providers immunity for civil
actions 248 or the responsibility statute may say that persons providing sport activities are
not liable unless injury or damage was caused by failure to comply with duties.249 In this
manner, sport providers can avoid liability for some injuries.25 ° Of course, a person will
241. Merrill, 698 A.2d at 1044 n.3. The court noted that it was not deciding or anticipating the effect of the
revised statute's definition of inherent risk because it was not an issue of the case. Id.
242. WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 (Michie 1997).
243. Id. The statute does define "inherent risk": "'Inherent risk' with regard to any sport or recreational
opportunity means those dangers or conditions which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of
any sport or recreational opportunity." Id. § I-1-122(a)(i).
244. Hansen-Stamp, supra note 13, at 272-77.
245. The Wyoming statute states:
Any person who takes part in any sport or recreational opportunity assumes the
inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity, whether those risks are known
or unknown, and is legally responsible for any and all damage, injury or death to
himself or other persons or property that results from the inherent risks in that sport or
recreational opportunity.
WYO. STAT. § 1-1-123(a) (Michie 1997); see also Hansen-Stamp, supra note 13, at 273-74.
246. Hansen-Stamp, supra note 13, at 273.
247. See id.
248. For example, the Connecticut ski statute provides:
It shall be a special defense to any civil action against an operator by a skier that such
skier: (1) Did not know the range of his own ability to negotiate any trail or slope
marked in accordance with subdivision (3) of section 29-211; (2) did not ski within
the limits of his own ability; (3) did not maintain reasonable control of speed and
course at all times while skiing; (4) did not heed all posted warnings; (5) did not ski
on a skiing area designated by the operator; or (6) did not embark on or disembark
from a passenger tramway at a designated area. In such civil actions the law of
comparative negligence shall apply.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-214 (West 1990).
249. The West Virginia Whitewater Responsibility Act shows such statutory language:
No licensed commercial whitewater outfitter or commercial whitewater guide acting in
the course of his employment is liable to a participant for damages or injuries to such
participant unless such damage or injury was directly caused by failure of the
commercial whitewater outfitter or commercial whitewater guide to comply with
duties.
W. VA. CODE § 20-3B-5(a) (1996).
250. See, e.g., Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 787 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Idaho 1990) (finding that by
conspicuously marking the entrance to ski slopes or areas, the sport provider had met the statutory duty and
did not incur liability for a skier's injuries).
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need to be within the statutory purview of a provider to qualify for the immunity of a
sport responsibility statute.2 5 ' The potential for the sport responsibility statutes to
achieve their stated purpose of reducing the liability of recreational operators may be
observed by examining two cases that considered the Idaho ski statute.
252
In Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co.,253 an injured skier sued the operator for negligence
concerning a signpost.254 While both the plaintiff and the defendant agreed that the ski
statute immunized the defendant from liability from risks inherent in the sport of skiing,
they disagreed whether the plaintiff's injuries were caused by an inherent risk.255 Pursu-
ant to a duty provided by the ski statute,256 the defendant operator had placed a sign
marking the relative degree of difficulty of the slope and trails.257 The signpost holding
this sign was the object with which the plaintiff had collided, and the plaintiff alleged
the construction or placement of the sign involved negligence. 8 In examining the ski
statute, the Idaho Supreme Court found that operators have a statutory duty "not to 'in-
tentionally or negligently cause injury to any person,' 259 but have no duty with respect
to activities undertaken to lessen risks inherent in the sport of skiing.260 Because of the
specific language that activities undertaken to reduce risks shall not "impose on the
operator any duty to accomplish such activities to any standard of care," 26' the court
found that running into the signpost was an inherent risk for which the defendant was
immune due to the statutory ski provisions. 262 Given the statutory reprieve, the defen-
dant was entitled to summary judgment. 63
In Long v. Bogus Basin Recreational Ass'n,26 the Idaho Supreme Court again con-
sidered issues about the Idaho ski statute. An injured skier brought suit against a ski
operator for injuries from a ski accident.265 One of the plaintiffs arguments was that the
defendant operator was negligent in not providing a sign indicating the relative degree
of difficulty as required by the ski statute.266 The court found that the plaintiff was ski-
251. See, e.g., Davis v. Sun Valley Ski Educ. Found., Inc., 941 P.2d 1301, 1304 (Idaho 1997) (finding that
the Idaho ski statute did not provide immunity to a non-profit corporation and its employee for possible
negligence in setting a ski course because they were not operators as defined by the statute).
252. See Northcutt v. Sun Valley Co., 787 P.2d 1159 (Idaho 1990); Long v. Bogus Basin Recreational
Ass'n, 869 P.2d 230 (Idaho 1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1101 to -1109 (1990).
253. 787 P.2d 1159 (Idaho 1990).
254. Northcutt, 787 P.2d at 1160. Another skier had collided with the plaintiff and caused the plaintiff to
then collide with the signpost. Id. at 1160-61. The skier who allegedly caused the accident left without being
identified. Id. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant had a duty to identify the skier who caused the
accident, but the court found no duty. Id. at 1163-64.
255. Northcutt, 787 P.2d at 1161. Plaintiff argued that the sign was improperly placed and should have been
properly padded. Id.
256. IDAHO CODE § 6-1103 (1990).
257. Northcutt, 787 P.2d at 1163.
258. Id. at 1161-63 (arguing that the sign should have been constructed with break-away poles).
259. Id. at 1162. (quoting IDAHO CODE § 6-1103(10) (Supp.1989)).
260. Northcutt, 787 P.2d at 1162 (analyzing IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1103, -1104, -1106 (1990)). Rather, skiers
assume the inherent risks of skiing. IDAHO CODE § 6-1106 (1990).
261. Northcutt, 787 P.2d at 1163 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 6-1103(10) (Supp.1989)).
262. Id. at 1163. See IDAHO CODE § 6-1107 (1990).
263. Northcutt, 787 P.2d at 1166.
264. 869 P.2d 230 (Idaho 1994).
265. Id. at 231. Plaintiffs leg injuries resulted from the plaintiff performing a "rock drop off into other
rocks." Id.
266. The Idaho statute states:
Every ski area operator shall have the following duties with respect to their operation
of a skiing area: . . . (3) To mark conspicuously the top or entrance to each slope or
trail or area, with an appropriate symbol for its relative degree of difficulty; and those
slopes, trails, or areas which are closed, shall be so marked at the top or entrance.
IDAHO CODE § 6-1103 (1990).
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ing in an undesignated area so there was no duty to mark the area.26 7 The plaintiff also
argued he was not a skier as defined by the ski statute268 since he went off the designated
trails. 2 69 The court decided that the plaintiff skier had violated his statutory duties 270 by
going off the trail. 27 1 If skiers who went off trails were no longer subject to the ski stat-
ute, skiers would be allowed to nullify some of the statutory responsibilities for partici-
pants. 272 The court opined that the ski statute establishes duties and the standard of care
for skiers and ski operators.273 The operator had not violated any statutory duties while
the injured participant had assumed the risk for his accident by skiing into an unmarked
area.
274
IV. Topics for Further Consideration
An evaluation of the various immunity statutes suggests that they offer provisions
that reduce the likelihood that providers of services and activities will be liable for dam-
ages from injuries. At the same time, the evaluation reveals five topics that might be
further examined to assist in discerning a preferred strategy for statutory dispensation.
First, statutory affirmative defenses for gross negligence raise the question whether
these can be defended in a society that strives for a fair resolution of disputes. Second,
limitations on admission fees in recreational use statutes, but not in sport activity and
other recent immunity statutes, may be overly exacting. Third, immunity for some ac-
tivities might be conditioned on encouraging safer recreational activities. Fourth, the
reduction of litigation expenses, a goal of some immunity statutes, must be balanced
against other issues of fairness. Finally, the array of immunity statutes shows an accu-
mulation of diverse provisions and privileged activities that defies simple rules and
categorization. By contrasting alternative strategies established in individual immunity
statutes, ideas for reform and simplification are illustrated for further consideration.
A. Immunity Statutes Sanctioning Excessive Conduct
Statutory affirmative defenses present issues as to whether particular conduct quali-
fies for the granted immunity. A comparison of statutory provisions raises concern
whether some statutes may be overgenerous in protecting persons who engage in egre-
gious conduct, generally gross negligence. Many immunity statutes provide that quali-
fying persons are not liable for damages if they meet the conditions set forth in the stat-
ute.275 Most statutes provide that the affirmative defense applies only if the actor was not
grossly negligent.276 Whenever a plaintiff alleges egregious conduct above the conduct
protected by the statute, an issue of whether the defendant breached a duty of care is
267. Long, 869 P.2d at 232. Moreover, it was found that the defendant had no duty with respect to
affirmative steps that could have averted the plaintiff's injuries. Id. 231. The court cited its finding from
Northcutt, 787 P.2d at 1163, that there are no other duties other that those stated in IDAHO CODE § 6-1103
(1990). Long, 869 P.2d at 232.
268. IDAHO CODE § 6-1102(6) (1990). A skier is "any person present in the skiing area ... engaging in the
sport of skiing by utilizing the ski slopes and trails .... Id.
269. Long, 869 P.2d at 233.
270. Under the ski statute, skiers had a duty "to ski only on a skiing area designated by the ski operator."
IDAHO CODE § 6-1106 (1990).
271. Long, 869 P.2d at 233.
272. Id. See also IDAHO CODE § 6-1106 (1990).
273. Long, 869 P.2d at 233.
274. Id.
275. For example, the New York Good Samaritan statute succinctly provides immunity for volunteer
firefighters: "Members of duly organized volunteer fire companies in this state shall not be liable civilly for
any act or acts done by them in the performance of their duty as volunteer firefighters .. " N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW § 205-b (McKinney Supp. 1998).
276. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
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established for consideration. Thereby, the plaintiff is entitled to a day in court, and the
defendant will need to respond to the allegations. By retaining liability for gross negli-
gence, the statutes may not be very significant in curtailing tort lawsuits.
As previously noted, the Good'Samaritan paradigm only provided immunity for
negligence, and this immunity was circumscribed by other provisions. 277 The analysis of
immunity statutes suggests that a few of the statutes retreat from the negligence standard
that has historically been a part of the Good Samaritan paradigm. Under some of the
veterinary Good Samaritan, 27 8 recreational use,279 equine liability,280 and pick-your-own
statutes, 28 1 persons can escape liability for actions involving gross negligence because
the statutory provisions provide an affirmative defense except where the defendant en-
gaged in willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.282 Although these statutes may sanction
gross negligence, it may be advanced that such statutory dispensation goes too far. For
example, under some of these statutes persons engaged in profit-seeking business enter-
prises may qualify for the proffered immunity.
28 3
An analysis of a recent case involving a horse accident shows the distinction be-
tween statutory immunity involving the absence of willful or wanton conduct as op-
posed to an absence of gross negligence.2 84 In Muller v. English,285 an experienced
equestrian was injured when defendant Muller's horse kicked her without warning in the
leg during a fox hunt.286 The plaintiff alleged that the horse was a habitual kicker and
vicious, and that these facts established a willful or wanton disregard for the plaintiff's
safety.287 Based upon the provisions of the Georgia equine liability statute, 288 the defen-
dants moved for summary judgment.289 They argued that there was no evidence that the
defendants had engaged in an act that constituted a willful or wanton disregard for the
277. The Good Samaritan paradigm had five elements that needed to be met to qualify for immunity. See
supra notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
280. For equine liability statutes, various statutory exceptions would cause a provider to be liable for gross
negligence in many situations. Injuries resulting from gross negligence would not be compensated only if they
involved an inherent risk. See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
282. For example, under an equine statute persons have a statutory defense against liability for damages
from inherent injuries but the defense is not available if the "the person committed an act or omission with
wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant and that act or omission caused the injury." TEX.
Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 87.004(4) (West 1997). Although other exceptions may mean a person
incurs liability for some injuries, the potential remains that a defendant's gross negligence does not result in
liability.
283. Immunity is available for profit-seeking businesses under the equine liability and pick-your-own
statutes.
284. See Centner, Modifying Negligence for Equine Activities in Arkansas: A New Good Samaritan
Paradigm for Equine Activity Sponsors, supra note 11, at 650-52 (analyzing two cases to disclose potential
immunity for gross negligence).
285. 472 S.E.2d 448 (Ga. App. 1996).
286. Id. at 450.
287. Id. at 452-54. The plaintiff was not able to substantiate the allegation of the animal being a kicker;
rather the evidence showed the horse had kicked on two other occasions. Id. Plaintiff argued that Muller's
horse was a dangerous latent condition because it was a vicious animal allowed by careless management to be
at liberty. Id. The court dispensed with this argument through a reasoned analysis of the pertinent definitions.
id.
288. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 4-12-1 to -4 (1995).
289. Muller, 472 S.E.2d at 450. The defendants argued that the injury resulted from an inherent risk of the
sport. Id.
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safety of the participant.29 ° In the absence of such evidence, the defendants claimed
immunity under the state's equine liability statute.29'
In considering the denial of defendants' summary judgment, the appellate court
analyzed the conduct protected by the equine liability statute. The plaintiff needed to
present evidence that defendant Muller had committed an act or omission that consti-
tuted willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the plaintiff.292 To show wanton con-
duct, the conduct needs to be "so reckless or so charged with indifference to the conse-
quences as to be equivalent in spirit to actual intent., 293 Because the equine activity was
a fox hunt, the conduct of the defendant's horse was ordinary equine behavior, and thus,
did not meet the statutory standard of willfulness. 294 Under the statute, the defendant
qualified for immunity. There was no issue for consideration by a jury.295
If an equine liability statute did not excuse gross negligence, the Muller allegation of
an injury from a kick of the defendant's horse would be analyzed differently. The evi-
dence suggested that, on occasion, the horse had kicked others.296 Although the court
found such conduct not to be willful or wanton disregard of the safety of others, 2 97 the
alleged facts introduce "room for difference of opinion between reasonable men...
whether in degree the negligence amounts to gross negligence.... ,298 Because the right
to draw inferences from the evidence is within the exclusi ,e province of the jury, the
facts about an "occasional kick" would present a question299 for a jury as to possible
gross negligence.3°° Thus, a statute providing immunity in the absence of gross negli-
gence rather than the absence of a willful and wanton injury standard would preclude
courts from disposing of some cases by summary judgment.
The issue for consideration is whether adequate public justification exists for a stat-
ute to provide immunity for gross negligence. A basis submitted for the recreational use
statute was to encourage the provision of land and facilities to others for recreational
activities. 30 1 Another justification that may be advanced in support of such a statutory
configuration is a desire to curtail litigation.30 2 If an immunity statute only provides
290. Id. Proof of willfulness or wantonness was required due to the immunity provided by the equine
liability statute. GA. CODE ANN. § 4-12-3(b)(3) (1995).
291. Muller, 472 S.E.2d at 450. See GA. CODE ANN. § 4-12-3(b) (1995).
292. Muller, 472 S.E.2d at 454. Case law interpretations of other statutes and common law revealed that
willful conduct requires actual intent to do harm or inflict injury. Id. at 452 (citations omitted).
293. Id. (referring to Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 450 S.E.2d 208 (1994)).
294. Witnesses testified that fox hunting involved horses that kick. Muller, 472 S.E.2d at 452-53. Through a
footnote, the court recognized that an inference of willful or wanton disregard for the safety of a participant
might be shown in a less hazardous equine activity or where children were involved. Id. at 452 n.6.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 453. Kicking by the horse had not occurred, however, numerous times. Id.
297. Id. at 452-53.
298. Trustees of Trinity College v. Ferris, 491 S.E.2d 909, 912 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
299. This shows how the incorporation of a willfulness standard can help curb litigation expenses. See infra
notes 352-354 and accompanying text (discussing ways to curtail litigation expenditures).
300. See Trustees of Trinity College, 491 S.E.2d at 912.
301. See Becker, supra note 10, at 1589 (noting the desire to encourage private land owners to make their
properties available to others).
302. For example, the Wisconsin recreational use statute asserts:
The legislature intends by this section to establish the responsibilities of participants
in recreational activities in order to decrease uncertainty regarding the legal
responsibility for deaths or injuries that result from participation in recreational
activities and thereby to help assure the continued availability in this state of
enterprises that offer recreational activities to the public.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.525 (West 1997).
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protection for qualifying negligent acts and retains liability for gross negligence, as oc-
curs in most Good Samaritan statutes, the statute may not preclude many lawsuits.
30 3
Because plaintiffs are able to allege gross negligence, a trier of the facts will be
needed to determine whether the statutory immunity for negligence is applicable to the
facts of the case.3° Statutes that adopt provisions granting immunity unless there was a
willful and wanton disregard for the plaintiff's safety are more likely to reduce litiga-
tion. When evaluating a statute that precludes a plaintiff from maintaining an action for
gross negligence, an inquiry might be made of whether such immunity is necessary and
whether there are other appropriate safeguards that may limit the number of defendants
who could qualify for immunity. 305 A legislative body might decide that a scheme
granting immunity in a few cases of gross negligence has merit due to a need to curb
litigation by persons who should assume the risk of injury for their own actions.30 6
As an alternative, a statutory modification of duties, rather than directly addressing
the level of care, offers another response to the issue of excessive litigation.30 7 The sport
responsibility statutes place duties on participants to modify the obligations that provid-
ers of sports owe participants.30 8 By addressing duties with respect to inherent risks, an
immunity statute may avoid precluding recovery for gross negligence.
B. Recreational Use Statutes' Provisions on Fees
Recreational use statutes, state that recreational providers do not have a duty to keep
land or premises safe for use by recreational users. However, these statutes generally
retain a historic limitation whereby immunity is available only when the provider pro-
vides land and water areas for recreational activities without an admission fee.309 Al-
though several states have digressed from this prohibition, 310 it has meant that a recrea-
tional use model could not serve as the precursor of a new model to reduce liability of
commercial providers of recreational activities. 31 1 Rather, legislatures have resorted to a
new statutory scheme called the sport responsibility statutes.
The analysis of immunity statutes in general shows that assorted statutory pro-
nouncements authorize immunity for commercial businesses. Persons collecting remu-
neration are able to qualify for immunity in the veterinary Good Samaritan, 31 2 equine
303. The statutory immunity for negligence will mean that it may be more difficult for the plaintiff to be
successful in recovering damages. Some plaintiffs, however, may be expected to forgo litigation due to the
heightened burden of proof for gross negligence.
304. A plaintiff simply needs to create the possibility of a difference of opinion between reasonable men.
See Trustees of Trinity College, 491 S.E.2d at 912.
305. The Good Samaritan paradigm shows methods to do this. Limitations on persons who can qualify for
the immunity is one possibility. Decreasing the zone of protection to an accident or inherent risk is another.
306. The determination does not address whether the legislative approval of a statute providing immunity
for gross negligence has the support of a majority of a legislator's constituents.
307. This occurs in recreational use and sport responsibility statutes.
308. See supra notes 195-218 and accompanying text.
309. The Model Act precluded qualification for the protection against liability whenever compensation was
paid by the recreational user. See Church, supra note 10, at 13; Becker, supra note 10, at 1602 (finding that the
Model Act clearly was limited to situations where not charge was imposed on the user).
310. See supra note 124.
311. As noted by others, greater incentives may be needed to encourage persons to provide recreational
activities. See, e.g., O'Brien, supra note 109, at 988.
312. See supra note 60 (listing ten state veterinary Good Samaritan statutes that decline to prohibit fees in
their immunity grant).
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liability,3 13 pick-your-own, 314 and sport responsibility statutes. 315 Legislative bodies
apparently have deemed that these commercial activities constitute special situations so
that the prohibition of a fee is no longer a necessary or appropriate precondition for
immunity.
316
Because commercial operators can qualify for immunity under these statutory provi-
sions, interest groups and legislatures may want to assess the absolute prohibitions
against remuneration in some of the state recreational use statutes. Through minor
amendments to a recreational use statute, the general prohibition against compensation
could be retained, but special situations could be identified where remuneration would
not defeat the statutory immunity. Five specific special situations are offered for further
consideration.
1. Ancillary Monies for Firewood
An exception in three recreational use statutes enables a recreational provider to
collect limited funds for the sale of firewood without disqualifying the provider from the
statutory immunity.317 The removal of firewood could facilitate beneficial forestry prac-
tices or allow a provider to improve the property for certain recreational purposes. Re-
moval could also constitute a method to eliminate debris as a preventive measure to
lessen the hazard of forest fires. The Connecticut statute limits the amount of wood
31 8
whereas the Washington statute allows an administrative fee of up to twenty-five dol-
lars.319
2. Land Conservation and Wildlife Management
Another feature to improve lands is for a recreational participant to offer to help a
provider with land conservation measures 320 or to improve the property for wildlife.
321
This could involve services for the removal of brush or trees, planting appropriate plant
species to provide a better habitat for game, or improving a stream habitat for fish.32 2 It
also might be in the form of a donation of money. 323 A legislature might find that contri-
butions for conservation and management of lands should be encouraged. An exception
313. All but one of the equine liability statutes sanction legislative dispensation in situations where a fee
was paid. See Appendix 2: State Equine Liability Statutes. Contra MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.12 (West Supp.
1998).
314. The pick-your-own provisions allow compensation. Pick-your own provisions in recreational use
statutes, such as Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 159-A (West Supp. 1997)) and Tennessee (TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 70-7-101 to -105 (1995)), preclude compensation.
315. These statutes were written for commercial providers of sport activities.
316. Three major justifications have been noted for a sport responsibility statute: promoting safety, reducing
injury litigation, and stabilizing economic conditions for a sport industry. Barr v. Mount Brighton, 546
N.W.2d 273 (Mich. App. Ct. 1996), appeal denied 562 N.W.2d 779 & 568 N.W.2d 671 (1997).
317. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557(k) (West 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.688(2)(b) (1990 &
Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.210(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998).
318. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557(k) (West 1991).
319. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.210(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1998).
320. For example, the Wisconsin recreational use statute considers land conservation measures: "The
following do not constitute payment to a private property owner for the use of his or her property for a
recreational activity: ... A donation of money, goods or services made for the management and conservation
of the resources on the property." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.52(6)(a) (West Supp. 1997).
321. For example, the Indiana recreational use statute addresses wildlife:
As used in this section .... monetary consideration" means a fee or other charge for
permission to go upon a tract of land. The term does not include ... services rendered
for the purpose of wildlife management; or (3) contributions in kind made for the
purpose of wildlife management.
IND. CODE ANN. § 14-22-10-2(b) (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998).
322. See, id.
323. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.52(6)(a) (West Supp. 1997).
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allowing such remuneration could be incorporated into the state's recreational use stat-
ute to foster these activities.
3. Contributions for Educational Services
To encourage property owners to make their private lands available for educational
purposes,324 contributions for education services could be added as a statutory exception
that would not disqualify the provider from the statutory immunity of the recreational
use statute. The North Carolina recreational use statute provides ,a specific exception for
contributions for such services.32 5 A recently amended Arizona recreational use statute
allows contributions to offset costs of educational or recreational premises and services
for public entities and nonprofit corporations. 326 The North Carolina and Arizona stat-
utes show that contributions for educational services could be added as a statutory ex-
ception so that more property providers might be encouraged to make their private lands
available for educational purposes.
4. Allowing Nominal Compensation
The Texas recreational use statute deviates more significantly from the prohibition
against compensation. Recreational providers may charge for entry to their premises and
qualify for the statutory immunity so long as the total charges are less than an amount
determined by the property's ad valorem taxation.327 This provision shows a desire to
allow persons to qualify for immunity despite collecting fees, but a desire that the fees
be modest. The ad valorem taxation of the premises is selected as a reference point for
determining what is nominal.328 Under this scheme, more valuable properties can collect
greater amounts and still qualify for the immunity protection afforded by the recrea-
tional use statute.
The Wisconsin legislature established a limit of $2,000 for compensation that does
not void the immunity of the recreation use statute.329 This monetary amount is in addi-
tion to other forms of remuneration permitted by the statute, including gifts of wild ani-
mals, goods and services for management and conservation of resources on the property,
and certain payments from nonprofit organizations.330 Washington State permits a
324. For example, the North Carolina recreational use statute acknowledges educational purposes:
"'Educational purpose' means any activity undertaken as part of a formal or informal educational program,
and viewing historical, natural, archaeological, or scientific sites." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 38A-2 (1997).
325. The North Carolina statute states:
For purposes of this chapter, the term "charge" does not include: (1) Any contribution
in kind, services or cash contributed by a person, legal entity, nonprofit organization,
or governmental entity other than the owner, whether or not sanctioned or solicited by
the owner, the purpose of which is to (i) remedy damage to land caused by educational
or recreational use; or (ii) provide warning of hazards on, or remove hazards from,
land used for educational or recreational purposes.
§ 38A-3.
326. 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws 22.
327. TEX. CtV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.003 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998). The dispensation granted
by the statute is available to a person who:
(2) charges for entry to the premises, but whose total charges collected in the previous
calendar year for all recreational use of the entire premises of the owner, lessee, or
occupant are not more than: (A) twice the total amount of ad valorem taxes imposed
on the premises for the previous calendar year; or (B) four times the total amount of
ad valorem taxes imposed on the premises for the previous calendar year, in the case
of agricultural land ....
Id.
328. See id.
329. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.52(6)(a) (West Supp. 1997).
330. Id.
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charge of an administrative fee of up to $25 without compromising qualification under
the recreational use statute.33" '
5. Insurance Coverage of Agricultural Land
An additional proposition is to allow recreational providers of agricultural land to
charge as long as they have insurance coverage structured to compensate injuries occur-
ring on their property.332 The Texas recreational use statute contains a provision
whereby providers of agricultural land who have adequate liability insurance coverage
may qualify for statutory immunity.333 The statute limits monetary damages for quali-
fying private landowners of agricultural land up to $500,000 for each person and $1
million for each occurrence of bodily injury or death if they have adequate liability in-
surance coverage to compensate injuries occurring on their property.334 For each occur-
rence, the provider's insurance coverage under the Texas recreational use statute needs
to be in the amount of $1 million.3 Because liability coverage must be in effect for the
limitation on monetary damages to apply, injured recreational users should receive com-
pensation for their injuries.336
C. Suitable Inmunity Prerequisites
Legislative bodies justified immunity statutes because of emergency, good deed, or
needed assistance. Yet, most legislative bodies loathed incorporating obligations with
their immunity provisions. For example, a majority of American Good Samaritan stat-
utes did not incorporate a duty to'rescue.337 Recreational use statutes reduced duties of
331. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.2 10 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998).
332. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.003 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999). The dispensation granted
by the recreational use statute is available to a person who "(3) has liability insurance coverage in effect on an
act or omission described by Section 75.004(a) and in the amounts equal to or greater than those provided by
that section." Id.
333. The Texas statute states in relevant part that:,
(a) Subject to Subsection (b), the liability of an owner, lessee, or occupant of
agricultural land used for recreational purposes for an act or omission by the owner,
lessee, or occupant relating to the premises that results in damages to a person who
has entered the premises is limited to a maximum amount of $500,000 for each person
and $1 million for each single occurrence of bodily injury or death and $100,000 for
each single occurrence for injury to or destruction of property. In the case of
agricultural land, the total liability of an owner, lessee, or occupant for a single
occurrence is limited to $1 million, and the liability also is subject to the limits for
each single occurrence of bodily injury or death and each single occurrence for injury
to or destruction of property stated in this subsection.
(b) This section applies only to an owner, lessee, or occupant of agricultural land used
for recreational purposes who has liability insurance coverage in effect on an act or
omission described by Subsection (a) and in the amounts equal to or greater than those
provided by Subsection (a). The coverage may be provided under a contract of
insurance or other plan of insurance authorized by statute. The limit of liability
insurance coverage applicable with respect to agricultural land may be a combined
single limit in the amount of $1 million for each single occurrence.
Id. § 75.004.
334. Id. § 75.004(a). Separate from the personal injury lid is a statutory limit of $100,000 for each single
occurrence of injury to or destruction of property. Id.
335. Id. § 75.004(b).
336. Id. § 75.004(b). Moreover, the Texas provisions do "not affect the liability of an insurer or insurance
plan in an action under Article 21.21, Insurance Code, or an action for bad faith conduct, breach of fiduciary
duty, or negligent failure to settle a claim." Id. § 75.004(c).
337. See John M. Adler, Relying Upon the Reasonableness of Strangers: Some Observations About the
Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or Protect Others, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 867, 872-77
(discussing the no-duty-to-rescue rule); Eric H. Grush, Comment, The Inefficiency of the No-Duty-to Rescue
Rule anda Proposed "Similar Risk" Alternative, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 881 (1998).
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persons providing recreational services but generally did not create duties. 338 In contrast,
the new sport responsibility statutes impose obligations. Participants have an obligation
to take care of themselves 339 while providers also have responsibilities centered around
the provision of safer activities. 340 Given that some of the duties incorporated in the
sport responsibility statutes are important in making the sport more safe, further consid-
eration as to how other immunity statutes could be structured to encourage safer recrea-
tional activities might be appropriate.
Safety prerequisites have been advanced for the equine liability statutes.34' Through
an amendment of an equine statute, provisions could be added to encourage the use of
helmets. One option would have the signs, required to be posted by equine sponsors,
include reference to helmets.342 A second possibility is to follow state bicycle safety
statutes and require minors to wear helmets when riding horses on public property and
rights-of-way.
343
New York has recently amended its Vehicle and Traffic law to incorporate this idea
of helmets for young persons on public rights-of-way. 344 Persons under the age of four-
teen are directed to wear helmets when riding or leading a horse on a highway and pri-
vate roads open to public -motor vehicles. 345 Equipment standards are included in the
New York law to ensure that the helmet should function properly in safeguarding the
child's head.346 While the New York statute may be expected to lead to safer equine
activities, further consideration might be given to individual immunity statutes to condi-
tion their grant of immunity on appropriate prerequisites that encourage safer activities.
D. Curtailing Litigation Expenditures
Reductions of liability and litigation are dual objectives of immunity statutes, with
the reduction of liability being most obvious in the sport responsibility statutes.347 For
example, the Montana ski statute specifically enumerates "a legitimate interest in main-
taining the economic viability of the ski industry by discouraging claims based on dam-
ages resulting from risks inherent in the sport, defining inherent risks, and establishing
338. See, e.g., Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 818 (Cal. Ct. App.1996) (finding under
the primary assumption of risk in California that no duty of care may be owned some participants of active
sports for normal experiences).
339. Under the sport responsibility statutes, the statutory grant often delineates responsibilities for
participants. See supra notes 213-18.
340. Under the sport responsibility statutes, the statutory grant often delineates responsibilities for
providers. See supra notes 195-98.
341. See Terence J. Centner, Adopting Good Samaritan Immunity for Defendants in the Horse Industry, 12
Agric. & Human Values 69 (1995) (arguing that equine liability statutes ought to include safety requirements
such as wearing a helmet); Centner (1998), Modifying Negligence Law for Equine Activities in Arkansas: A
New Good Samaritan Paradigm for Equine Activity Sponsors, supra note 11, at 658 (advocating warnings and
required use of a helmet by minors).
342. Centner (1998), Modifying Negligence Law for Equine Activities in Arkansas: A New Good Samaritan
Paradigm for Equine Activity Sponsors, supra note 11, at 656 (advancing a statutory amendment whereby
warning signs could include a provision noting helmet safety).
343. Id. at 658 (suggesting an amendment to require persons under 16 years of age to wear a helmet when
engaging in equestrian activities on public property).
344. 1999 N.Y. LAWS 457 (signed by the Governor on September 7, 1999).
345. Id.; N.Y.VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1260(b) (Consol. 1996).
346. 1999 N.Y. LAWS 457. The law requires that the helmet meet or exceed the American Society for
Testing Materials F1l163 equestrian standard. Id. Furthermore, the helmet must be fastened securely upon the
head pursuant to the manufacturer's fitting guidelines. Id.
347. E.g., the Idaho ski statute sets forth a purpose of "defin[ing] those areas of responsibility and
affirmative acts for which ski area operators shall be liable for loss, damage or injury, and to define those risks
which the skier expressly assumes and for which there can be no recovery." IDAHO CODE § 6-1101 (1999).
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the duties of skiers and ski area operators." 348 Although most sport responsibility stat-
utes do not prevent plaintiffs from bringing a lawsuit, plaintiffs with injuries caused by
inherent risks of the sport may be expected to not file suit because, under the statute,
they cannot recover their damages. 349 By setting forth participant duties and risks for
which participants cannot recover, the statutes diminish liability of sport operators.
Sport responsibility statutes also grant providers immunity.350 Moreover, as statutory
parameters become understood, plaintiffs without a bona fide claim due to the immunity
provided by a statute may be expected to be less likely to find an attorney willing to
represent them in a lawsuit.
3 5
'
Related to the reduction of litigation expenditures is the issue of whether the deter-
mination of qualification under the statute is a question of law or a question of fact. As
previously noted, courts in different states considering individual statutory provisions
have reached different results. 352 If a court finds that a jury decision is required to de-
termine whether an injury resulted from an inherent risk under a specific statute,35 3 it
may be possible to amend the statute so that future courts could decide as a matter of
law that an injury was or was not the result of an inherent risk.354 In this manner, cases
involving inherent risks would not require a jury trial and associated expenditures.
E. Privileged Activities and an Array of Statutes
The piecemeal approach taken by states with separate provisions for different rec-
reational and sport activities has created a myriad of different rules for addressing inju-
ries. Because new statutory provisions and terminology raise unique issues to be an-
swered, until the legislative assignment of duties and risks becomes more clear, parties
may be expected to espouse their rights through litigation.355 While this may result in a
short-term increase in litigation, the statutory directives stating that providers do not
have a duty of care concerning inherent risks should lead some sport participants to
forgo litigation concerning their injuries.
The equine liability and sport responsibility statutes suggest that legislative bodies
have been open to the perceived needs of some interest groups.356 New sport-specific
inherent risk statutes have been adopted due to the liability concerns of providers of
risky sports. 3 57 yet, it is not clear that most legislative bodies have employed meaningful
criteria in determining when a commercial sport activity should qualify for statutory
348. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-731 (1999).
349. See supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 248-49 (quoting sport responsibility statute provisions that grant providers immunity).
351. Because such suits are often on a contingency basis, a lawyer with doubts about the likelihood of
success may be expected to decline to represent the injured party.
352. See supra notes 222-4 and accompanying text.
353. This was the case in the Maine ski statute. See Merrill v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp., 698 A.2d 1042,
1044 (Me. 1997). Now the statute defines such risk. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 15217 (West Supp. 1999).
See supra notes 236-241 and accompanying text.
354. E.g., for the Montana ski statute, a redefinition of bare spots to include a rocky outcropping might
avoid a future jury trial. MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-736(4)(b) (1995). See Mead v. M.S.B., Inc., 872 P.2d 782
(Mont. 1994). See supra notes 231-235 and accompanying text.
355. Thus, appellate courts are considering cases in which summary judgment due to qualification under a
sport responsibility statute is appropriate. See, e.g., Schaefer v. Mt. Southington Ski Area, Inc., No. CV
970340387S, 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 2824, at *7-9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1997) (finding that a rut
on a ski slope did not establish negligence of the provider duty to ski statute); Rousseau v. Beckley, No.
CV95465970, 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 3509, at *6-7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 27, 1996) (noting a ski
statute provided immunity in an action alleging that a variation in terrain caused an injury).
356. See Appendices 2, 4, & 5.
357. See Centner (1998), supra note 11, at 639 n.8 (noting problems of securing insurance for businesses
providing equine activities).
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immunity. For example, legislatures have decided that profitable business enterprises
providing horseback riding 58 or skiing359 qualify for immunity, whereas similar busi-
nesses providing tennis3 60 and golf36I do not. While tennis and golf may have fewer
injuries than horseback riding and. skiing, it is not clear that such numbers should trans-
late into different treatment for liability purposes.
A dominant factor contributing to the enactment of some of the sport responsibility
statutes has been the perceived ability of participants to control risks.362 Participants
need to use their knowledge and skills to avoid situations that may lead to an injury, and
thus their statutory duties.363 Yet, participants in tennis and golf can control risks.36
Rather than proceed on a sport-by-sport basis, consideration might be given for all sport
activities, as has occurred in Wyoming.365 Alternatively, general tort law may already
have developed the assumption of risk doctrine so that participants are responsible for
their actions. This may obviate the need for special sport responsibility statutes.366
A few states have attempted to simplify their immunity provisions for more than one
activity. As previously noted, Wyoming's Recreational Safety Act367 provides a single
statute for risky sport activities.368 Michigan has combined provisions for recreational
uses, gleaning, and pick-your-own operations into a single statute.369 Although the
Michigan statute establishes different provisions for the different activities, the em-
ployment of a single statute requires that the provisions be read together. As compared
to three separate statutes, the Michigan statute may circumscribe arguments about the
meaning of various provisions. Additional efforts to aggregate statutory provisions for
sport activities may be worthwhile in simplifying liability rules.
V. Conclusion
Three distinct strategies altering long-standing tort law have been employed to pro-
vide immunity for qualifying persons. Statutes providing Good Samaritans and others an
affirmative defense assist persons in avoiding liability for injuries to others. Recreational
use statutes with their altered duties constitute a second strategy to offer protection for
landowners against liability from recreational users. While such statutes are important in
358. See INJURY SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM, supra note 1 (estimating that there were 58,701 injuries due to
horseback riding in 1997).
359. See id. (estimating that there were 84,190 injuries due to snow skiing in 1997).
360. See id., product code 3283 (estimating that there were 22,294 injuries due to tennis in 1997).
361. See id., product codes 1212, 1213 (estimating that there were 47,777 injuries due to golfing and golf
carts in 1997).
362. Some of the equine liability and ski statutes specifically note that the risks inherent in the sport support
the statutory dispensation. For example, the Montana statute states:
The legislature finds that skiing is a major recreational sport and a major industry in
the state and recognizes that among the attractions of the sport are risks, inherent and
otherwise. The state has a legitimate interest in maintaining the economic viability of
the ski industry by discouraging claims based. on damages resulting from risks
inherent in the sport, defining inherent risks, and establishing the duties of skiers and
ski area operators.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-731 (1999).
363. See supra notes 210-218 and accompanying text.
364. As an example, players of tennis and golf who wander off their court or green to look for a ball can
avoid being in a position where they might be hit by another player's ball.
365. WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 (Michie 1997).
366. See, e.g., Allen v. Snow Summit, Inc., 59 Ca. Rptr. 2d 813, 818 (Cal. Ct. App.1996) (finding under
California law that skiers accept some of the risks of injury under the primary assumption of risk doctrine).
367. Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 (Michie 1997).
368. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
369. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301 (West 1999).
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encouraging recreational activities on private lands, they fail to address liability issues
of providers of active and more dangerous sport activities. The new sport responsibility
statutes constitute a third strategy that precludes participants from collecting damages
for injuries resulting from an inherent danger of a sport. This strategy may be expected
to reduce lawsuits against providers of the applicable dangerous sports.
The analysis of immunity statutes shows that the gleaning, equine liability, and pick-
your-own statutes have not followed a single immunity strategy. While some state
gleaning and pick-your-own statutes provide an affirmative defense,370 others employ
the recreational use model and address duties.371 Some equine liability statutes offer an
affirmative defense,372 while other statutes embody provisions that follow the sport re-
sponsibility model whereby participants cannot collect damages for injuries resulting
from an inherent danger of the sport.373 Because various statutory provisions employ
contrasting models, the evaluation of a statute's objectives may disclose preferred
strategies. The articulation of five topics concerning the immunity statutes in Section IV
has established several important issues for consideration.
First, legislatures determine what type of conduct an immunity statute should shield.
Interest groups and the general public need to realize that exceptions from conventional
liability rules are possible. If sufficient concern exists about a statute that provides im-
munity for gross negligence, a reevaluation may be warranted to determine whether
such protection is truly desired. It might be expected that the general public does not
favor such broad immunity.
Second, long-standing provisions regarding disqualification of recreational provid-
ers due to compensation might be reevaluated given new sport responsibility statutes
and the special exceptions that have been incorporated into a few recreational use stat-
ues. 37 4 If a legislature has provided statutory dispensation to commercial sport providers,
perhaps other worthy individuals should be granted immunity in circumscribed situa-
tions. Several unique provisions are suggested by one or more existing state recreational
use statutes to retain the prohibition against remuneration but to allow compensation in
the form of: (1) a fee for firewood; (2) assistance with land conservation and wildlife
management; (3) contributions for educational services; (4) nominal compensation; and
(5) charges coupled with insurance coverage of agricultural land.375 Perhaps it is time to
update recreational use statutes so that they can be more effective in encouraging private
property owners to make their lands available to the public.
A third issue is the incorporation of suitable safety prerequisites. Immunity might
only be offered if there is an accompanying statutory provision that encourages efforts
to provide for safer activities. The equine liability statutes have failed to avail them-
selves of knowledge concerning the reduction of injuries by the proper use of helmets.
Fourth, some statutes may not be very successful in curtailing litigation and expen-
ditures. While statutes providing an affirmative defense for negligence reduce situations
where a plaintiff can recover from injuries, these statutes may shift the analysis to gross
negligence so that litigation is still necessary. The recreational use and sport responsi-
bility models offer methods to reduce litigation through statutory assignments of duties
to participants. Perhaps some of the statutes providing an affirmative defense could be
revised to assign duties for persons receiving assistance to help curb litigation.
370. See supra notes 86 & 153.
371. See supra notes 87 & 158.
372. See supra notes 127-3 1.
373. See supra notes 147-49.
374. See supra note 124.
375. See supra notes 317-36.
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Although sport responsibility statutes may be expected to reduce litigation and re-
covery against providers of enumerated sports, additional reduction of litigation costs
may be possible. The question of whether an injury was a result of an inherent risk may
be a question of law or a question of fact. If a sport responsibility statute is written so
that inherent risks are questions of law, the statute has the potential of reducing litigation
expenditures.
Finally, consideration might be given to the reduction of different immunity statutes.
Some of the Good Samaritan statutes might be combined or grouped together in a com-
mon section of a state's codified laws. Various sport responsibility statutes might be
combined, or a general statute written to cover all risky sports as has occurred in Wyo-
ming.376 Moreover, the coordination of a state's immunity statutes might lead to greater
consistency of standards and conditions, thereby simplifying the law for practitioners
and the general public.
376. WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 (Michie 1997).
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Appendix 1: State Recreational Use Statutes
ALA. CODE §§ 35-15-20 to -28 (1991)
ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.200 (1996)
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-1551 (West Supp. 1997), 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws 22
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-11-301 to -307 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1997)
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 846, 846.1 (West Supp. 1998)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33-41-101 to -106 (West 1998)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-557f to -557k (West 1991)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7 §§ 5901-5907 (1991)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 375.251 (Harrison 1988 & Supp. 1997)
GA. CODE ANN. § 27-3-1 (1984); §§ 51-3-20 to -26 (1982)
HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 520-1 to -8 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1997)
IDAHO CODE § 36-1604 (1994)
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/1 to 65/7 (West 1993)
IND. -CODE ANN. §§ 14-22-10-2 to -2.5 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998)
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 461C.1-.7 (West 1997)
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-3201 to -3207 (1994 & Supp. 1996)
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 150.645, 411.190 (Banks-Baldwin 1994), 1998 Ky. H.B.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:2791, 9:2795 (West 1997)
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 159-A (West Supp. 1997)
MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES. §§ 5-1101 to -1109 (1997)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, § 17C (West 1994)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301 (West Supp. 1998)
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 604A.20-.27 (West Supp. 1998)
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 89-2-1 to -27 (1991)
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 537.345-.348 (West 1988)
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-16-301 to -302 (1997)
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 37-729 to -736 (1998)
NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.510 (1997)
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 212:34 (1989)
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42A-2 to -10 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-7 (Michie 1995)
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-103 (McKinney 1989)
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 38A-1 to -4 (1997)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-08-01 to -06 (1989 & Supp. 1997)
OHIoREv. CODE ANN. §§ 1533.18-.181 (Banks-Baldwin 1996)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 1301-315 (West 1993), tit. 76, §§ 5, 11 (West 1995)
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 105.670-.696 (1990 & Supp. 1996)
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 477-1 to -8 (West 1994)
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 32-6-1 to -7 (1994 & Supp. 1997)
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-3-10 to-70 (Law. Co-op. 1991)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 20-9-12 to-18 (1995)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 70-7- 101 to -105 (1995)
TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 75.001-.004 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-14-1 to -7 (Supp. 1998)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 5791-5795 (Supp. 1998)
VA. CODE ANN. § 29.1-509 (Michie 1997)
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Appendix 1 (continued): State Recreational Use Statutes
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.200-.210 (West 1988 & Supp. 1998)
W. VA. CODE §§ 19-25-1 to -7 (1997)
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.52, 895.525 (West 1997), 1997 Wis. Act 242
WYO. STAT. §§ 34-19-101 to -106 (Michie 1997)
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Appendix 2: State Equine Liability Statutes
Ala. Code § 6-5-337 (1993)
ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-553 (1998), 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws 193
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-120-201 to -202 (Michie Supp. 1997)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-119 (West 1997)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557p (West Supp. 1998)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8140 (Supp. 1996)
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 773.01-.05 (Harrison 1994 & Supp. 1997)
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 4-12-1 to -5 (1995)
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 663B-1 to -2 (Michie 1995)
IDAHO CODE § § 6-1801 to -1802 (1998)
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/1 to 47/999 (West Supp. 1998)
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-2-40 to -43, 34-6-2-69, 34-6-2-95, 34-31-5-1 to-5 (Michie
1998)
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 673.1-.3 (West 1998)
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-4001 to -4004 (1994)
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795.1 (West 1997)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, §§ 4101--4104-A (West Supp. 1997)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 128, § 2D (Supp. 1998)
MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 691.1661-.1667 (West Supp. 1998)
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.12 (West Supp. 1998)
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 95-11-1 to -7 (1994)
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.325 (West Supp. 1998)
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-725 to -728 (1997)
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,249 to -21,253 (Supp. 1997)
1998 N.H. LAWS 24, 1998 N.H. H.B. 793
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:15-1 to -12 (West Supp. 1998)
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-13-1 to -5 (Michie Supp. 1998)
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99E-1 to -3 (1997)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-10-01 to -02 (Supp. 1997)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.321 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1998)
OR. REv. CODE §§ 30.687-.697 (Supp. 1996)
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 4-21-1 to -4 (Supp. 1997)
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 47-9-710 to -730 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 42-11-1 to -5 (Michie Supp. 1998)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 44-20-101 to -105 (1993)
TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 87.001-.005 (West 1997)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27b-101 to -102 (1996)
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3.1-796.130----.133 (Michie 1994)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1039 (Supp. 1998)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.530-.540 (West Supp. 1998)
W. VA. CODE §§ 20-4-1 to -7 (1996)
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.481 (West 1997)
WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 (Michie 1997)
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Appendix 3: State Pick-Your-Own Statutes
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 18-60-107 (Michie Supp. 1997)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 128 § 2E (Supp. 1998)
MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 324.73301(4) (West Supp. 1998)
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508:14 (1997)
N.J. STAT. ANN.-§ 10 (West Supp. 1998)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 901.52 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1998)
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 8339 (West Supp. 1998)
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Appendix 4: State Sport Responsibility Statutes for Skiing
ALASKA STAT. §§ 05.45.010-.210 (1996)
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 33-44-101 to -114 (West 1998)
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-211 to -214 (West 1990)
IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1101 to -1109 (1998)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 15201-15227 (West Supp. 1997)
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 143, §§ 71H-71S (West 1991 & Supp. 1998)
MICH. COMp. LAWS §§ 408.321-.344 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998)
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-731 to -736 (1997)
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 455A.010-.190 (1997)
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 225-A: 1 to -A:26 (1989)
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-15-1 to-14 (Michie 1994)
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:13-1 to -11 (West 1996)
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW §§ 18-101 to -107 (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1998)
N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 865L-868 (McKinney 1988)
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99C-1 to -5 (1997)
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 53-09-01 to -11 (1989 & Supp. 1997)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4169.01-.99 (Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1998)
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.970--.990 (1988)
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 7102 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998)
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 41-8-1 to -4 (1997)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 68-114-101 to -107 (1996)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-51 to -54 (1996)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 1036-1038 (Supp. 1998)
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 70-117.010--.040 (West 1992)
W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3A-1 to -8 (1996)
WYO. STAT. §§ 1-1-121 to -123 (Michie 1997)
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Appendix 5: State Sport Responsibility Statutes for
Sports other than Skiing
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-120 (West 1997) (baseball)
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-43 (Supp. 1998) (roller skating)
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-4-280 to -283 (Supp. 1998) (fishing)
IDAHO CODE §§ 6-1201 to -1206 (1998) (outfitters and guides)
745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 52/1 to 52/99 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998) (hockey fa-
cilities)
745 ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. 72/1 to 72/30 (West Supp. 1998) (roller skating)
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-31-6-1 to -4 (Michie 1998) (roller skating)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 601--608 (West 1997) (roller skating)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 801-806 (West Supp. 199.7) (amusement rides)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 691.1544 (West Supp. 1998) (sport shooting)
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1721-.1726 (West Supp. 1998) (roller skating)
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-651 to -656 (1997) (snowmobiling)
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 99E-10 to -14 (1997) (roller skating)
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:14-1 to-7 (West 1996) (roller-skating)
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 455B.010-.100 (1997) (amusement rides)
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4171.01--.10 (Banks-Baldwin 1994 & Supp. 1998)
(roller skating)
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 52-21-10 to -60 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (roller skating)
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 2-20A-21 (1998) (snowmobiling)
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 759.001-.005 (West Supp.1998) (roller
skating)
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 47-3-1 to -3 (Supp. 1998) (sport shooting)
W. VA. CODE §§ 20-3B-1 to-5 (1996) (whitewater rafting)
[Vol. 26:1
